SC-300 Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Questions and Answers

To prevent all users from using legacy authentication protocols when authenticating to Microsoft Entra ID, you can create a Conditional Access policy that blocks legacy authentication. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Conditional Access Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Give your policy a name that reflects its purpose, like “Block Legacy Auth”.

Set users and groups:

Under Assignments, select Users or workload identities.

Under Include, select All users.

Under Exclude, select Users and groups and choose any accounts that must maintain the ability to use legacy authentication.It’s recommended to exclude at least one account to prevent lockout1.

Target resources:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps.

Set conditions:

Under Conditions > Client apps, set Configure to Yes.

Check only the boxes for Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients.

Configure access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Block access.

Enable policy:

Confirm your settings and set Enable policy to Report-only initially to understand the impact.

After confirming the settings using report-only mode, you can move theEnable policytoggle fromReport-onlytoOn2.

By following these steps, you will block legacy authentication protocols for all users, enhancing the security posture of your organization by requiring modern authentication methods. Remember to monitor the impact of this policy and adjust as necessary to ensure business continuity.

To ensure that users in the Sg-Operations group see a tab named “Operations” containing only LinkedIn and Box applications in the My Apps portal, you can create a collection with these specific applications. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, Cloud Application Administrator, Application Administrator, or owner of the service principal.

Navigate to App launchers:

Go to Identity > Applications > Enterprise applications.

Under Manage, select App launchers.

Create a new collection:

Click on New collection.

Enter “Operations” as the Name for the collection.

Provide a Description if necessary.

Add applications to the collection:

Select the Applications tab within the new collection.

Click on + Add application.

Search for and select LinkedIn and Box applications.

Click Add to include them in the collection.

Assign the collection to the Sg-Operations group:

Select the Users and groups tab.

Click on + Add users and groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Operations group.

Click Select to assign the collection to the group.

Review and create the collection:

Select Review + Create to check the configuration.

If everything is correct, click Create to finalize the collection.

By following these steps, when users in the Sg-Operations group visit the My Apps portal, they will see a new tab named “Operations” that contains only the LinkedIn and Box applications1.

Please note that to create collections on the My Apps portal, you need a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license1.

To ensure that all users can consent to apps that require permission to read their user profile and prevent them from consenting to apps that require any other permissions, you can configure the user consent settings in the Microsoft Entra admin center. Here’s how you can do it:

Sign in as a Global Administrator:

Access the Microsoft Entra admin center with Global Administrator privileges.

Navigate to user consent settings:

Go toIdentity>Applications>Enterprise applications>Consent and permissions>User consent settings1.

Configure the consent settings:

Under User consent for applications, select the option that allows users to consent to apps that only require permission to read their user profile.

Ensure that all other permissions are set to require administrator consent, thus preventing users from consenting to apps that require additional permissions1.

Save the settings:

After configuring the consent settings, select Save to apply the changes.

By following these steps, you will have configured the system to allow user consent for apps that need to read the user profile while blocking consent for apps that require additional permissions. This setup helps maintain user autonomy where appropriate while safeguarding against unauthorized access to broader permissions.

To add the LinkedIn application as a resource to the Sales and Marketing access package without removing any other resources, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Identity Governance Administrator.

Navigate to Entitlement Management:

Go to Identity governance > Entitlement management > Access packages1.

Select the Sales and Marketing access package:

Find and select the Sales and Marketing access package to modify it.

Add a new resource:

Within the access package details, select Resources.

Click on + Add resource.

Search for and select the LinkedIn application from the list of available resources.

Configure the resource role:

Assign the appropriate role for the LinkedIn application that users in the Sales and Marketing access package will have.

Review and update the access package:

Ensure that the LinkedIn application has been added as a resource.

Confirm that no other resources have been removed from the access package.

Save the changes:

After reviewing, save the changes to the access package.

Communicate the update:

Notify the relevant users about the addition of the LinkedIn application to their access package.

By following these steps, you will successfully add the LinkedIn application to the Sales and Marketing access package without affecting the other resources.

To create a group named “Audit” and ensure that its members can activate the Security Reader role, follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to Groups:

Go toTeams & groups>Active teams and groups1.

Create the security group:

Select Add a security group.

On the Set up the basics page, enter “Audit” as the group name.

Add a description if necessary and chooseNext1.

Edit settings:

On theEdit settingspage, select whether you want Microsoft Entra roles to be assignable to this group and selectNext1.

Assign roles:

After creating the group, go to Roles > All roles.

Find and select the Security Reader role.

Under Assignments, choose Assign.

Select the “Audit” group to assign the role to its members2.

Review and finish:

Review the settings to ensure the “Audit” group is created with the ability for its members to activate the Security Reader role.

Finish the setup and save the changes.

By following these steps, you will have created the “Audit” group and enabled its members to activate the Security Reader role, which allows them to view security-related information without having permissions to change it. Remember to communicate the new group and role assignment to the relevant stakeholders in your organization.

Assigning built-in directory roles (like Device Administrators) to a group requires a role-assignable group. The SC-300 documentation explains: “You can assign Azure AD roles to a cloud security group by creating the group with the setting ‘Azure AD roles can be assigned to the group.’” It further emphasizes: “This attribute is immutable; you must decide at creation time. You cannot convert an existing group to be role-assignable later.” When a standard security group is not created as role-assignable, it will not appear in the picker when attempting to assign a directory role—exactly the behavior observed: “groups that aren’t role-assignable cannot be selected for Azure AD role assignments.” Therefore, the first step is to recreate IT_Group1 as a role-assignable security group (often called an “eligible for role assignment” group) and then assign the Device Administrators role to that group. Changing membership types (Dynamic User or Dynamic Device) or adding owners does not convert an existing group into a role-assignable one and thus would not resolve the issue.

In Azure AD, license automation is implemented through group-based licensing. The SC-300 materials explain that “you can assign licenses to a group in Azure Active Directory; when you assign a license to a group, all users who are members of the group are assigned that license”. They also clarify that “dynamic group membership uses rules to automatically add or remove users based on user attributes”, which is the recommended way to on-board new populations without manual effort. For licensing, the guide is explicit that “group-based licensing works with security groups and Microsoft 365 Groups” and that “distribution lists are not supported for license assignment”. Administrative Units are described as “a scoping mechanism for delegating administrative permissions to subsets of users and devices”, not a licensing entity. Likewise, Organizational Units (OUs) are on-premises AD containers and “do not control license assignment in Azure AD”.

Given the requirement to allocate licenses automatically to new A. Datum users as they appear, the least-effort, policy-driven approach is to create an Azure AD Dynamic User security group with a membership rule that targets those users (for example, by domain, company attribute, or a synced attribute), then assign the required Microsoft 365/Azure AD licenses to that group. As the documentation notes, “when users join or leave the group based on the rule, licenses are added or removed automatically.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and Microsoft Learn modules on Azure AD Identity Governance, the correct way to manage user access—especially for scenarios involving both internal and external users—is through Entitlement Management in Azure AD Identity Governance.

Entitlement Management uses access packages to define and automate how users obtain access to resources such as groups, SharePoint sites, and applications. Access packages contain policies that specify who can request access (internal users, external users, or both) and how that access is approved and periodically reviewed. The guide clearly states:

“Access packages provide a structured method to configure and automate access for users, ensuring that access assignments follow the organization’s policy and compliance requirements.”

To enable external collaboration with another organization (such as fabrikam.com), Microsoft documentation emphasizes that you must create a connected organization. A connected organization represents an external directory or domain whose users can be invited to request access packages or participate in identity governance workflows. The connected organization defines trust boundaries for cross-tenant collaboration, without requiring domain federation or acceptance.

In summary:

Access packages configure and automate user access.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn documentation on Managed Identities for Azure Resources, the recommended and most secure method for an Azure resource (like an App Service) to access another Azure resource (such as an Azure SQL Database) is through Managed Identities.

Managed identities allow Azure services to authenticate securely to other Azure services that support Azure AD authentication, without requiring the use of credentials stored in code, configuration files, or key vaults.

There are two types of managed identities:

System-assigned managed identity

Created and tied directly to the lifecycle of a specific Azure resource (e.g., App Service).

When the resource (App1) is deleted, the identity is automatically deleted as well.

Best suited when a single resource requires authentication to access another Azure service.

User-assigned managed identity

Created as an independent Azure resource.

Can be assigned to multiple services and managed separately.

Useful for scenarios requiring shared identity or cross-service authentication management.

App1 (Azure App Service) must access db1 (Azure SQL Database).

Credentials should be available only to App1, meaning other resources should not share or reuse the identity.

Administrative effort should be minimized, implying automatic management of credentials and lifecycle.

Hence, a system-assigned managed identity is the best solution because it meets all three conditions:

No manual credential management (Azure handles authentication token issuance automatically).

The identity exists only for App1 (it’s unique to that resource).

Simplified lifecycle — identity is created and deleted automatically with App1.

???? Official Microsoft Documentation (aligned with SC-300 exam objectives):

“System-assigned managed identities are ideal for scenarios where a single Azure resource requires access to another Azure service and you want Azure to automatically manage the identity’s lifecycle.”

“Managed identities eliminate the need for developers to manage credentials in code or configuration files.”

Microsoft Entra Permissions Management (formerly CloudKnox) integrates with Azure subscriptions via a service principal that must read and write role assignments to analyze and right-size permissions. The User Access Administrator role provides this ability without full ownership privileges.

The SC-300 guide explicitly notes that to allow automatic monitoring and remediation of permissions, “the Permissions Management service principal must have the User Access Administrator role on the target subscription or management group to modify and create RBAC assignments.”

Reader (A) and Contributor (B) roles cannot manage RBAC permissions, while Owner (C) grants unnecessary broad control, violating the principle of least privilege.

The environment uses Azure AD Pass-through Authentication (PTA), which enables users to sign in using their on-premises passwords without storing them in the cloud. For high availability, Microsoft recommends installing multiple PTA agents on separate servers that can securely communicate with Azure AD.

From the SC-300 study material:

“Pass-through authentication agents should not be installed on domain controllers. Install agents on dedicated or member servers that have internet access and are domain-joined.”

Let’s analyze the servers:

Server1 (PDC emulator) and Server2 (Infrastructure master) — Domain controllers; should not directly connect to the internet or run additional software.

Server3 (Azure AD Connect server) — Already hosts Azure AD Connect, which is sufficient for synchronization; installing PTA here would violate the "only required software" policy.

Server4 (Unassigned member server) — Domain-joined, not a DC, and can securely communicate with Azure AD; the best candidate for installing an additional PTA agent.

A Data Collection Rule (DCR) in Azure Monitor defines what data is collected, where it’s sent, and how it’s transformed before ingestion. It controls log and metric collection, not alert notifications.

Creating or editing a DCR does not change who receives alerts. It only changes the data ingestion pipeline for monitoring and analytics.

Since the goal is to redirect alert emails to a new administrator, modifying or creating a DCR will not achieve that.

No

Yes

Yes

In Microsoft Entra/Azure RBAC, permissions are granted by role + scope and inherit down the hierarchy (subscription → resource group → resource). The SC-300 materials clarify that the Reader role is “a management-plane role that permits viewing resources but not modifying them or accessing data contents.” Therefore, although Group1 has Reader at Sub1, User1 (Group1, Group2) cannot read Key Vault secrets in Vault1 because Reader does not grant data-plane access. The study guide also notes for Azure Key Vault with RBAC: “Key Vault Secrets User can read secret contents (get/list) for vaults in the assigned scope.” Since Group2 holds Key Vault Secrets User at RG2, any member of Group2 (including User2) can read secrets in Vault2 (which is in RG2). However, that assignment does not extend to RG1, so it doesn’t help User1 with Vault1. Finally, SC-300 coverage of built-in roles states: “Owner grants full access to all resources within the scope, including the ability to modify settings and delegate access.” Because Group3 is Owner at RG1, User3 can manage resources in RG1, including updating the configuration of VM1 located there.

Result: User1 → No, User2 → Yes, User3 → Yes.

According to the Microsoft Entra External Identities module within the SC-300 curriculum, control over which external domains can be invited as guest users is managed under External collaboration settings in the Entra admin center.

Administrators can specify “Allow invitations only to the specified domains” and list approved domains. This ensures that guest invitations can only be sent to trusted business partners while blocking all others.

Cross-tenant access settings control authentication and access policies between trusted tenants, not invitation restrictions. Linked subscriptions and identity providers manage billing and authentication federation but do not control guest invitations.

Therefore, to restrict guest invitations to specific external domains, you must configure the External collaboration settings in Microsoft Entra ID.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and official Microsoft Learn documentation (“Configure how end-users consent to applications”), application consent management in Microsoft Entra ID is governed by the Admin consent settings under Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → User consent settings.

By default, users can grant delegated permissions to apps, but organizations often need to restrict which permissions users may consent to — for example, allowing consent only to low-impact permissions like User.Read (basic profile information).

Microsoft Documentation Reference:

“In the Admin consent settings, you can control how end users grant consent to applications. You can limit user consent to low-risk permissions, such as permissions that only allow apps to access the user’s basic profile data.”

The configuration steps outlined in Microsoft’s official SC-300 training materials are:

In the Entra admin center, go to Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → User consent settings.

Under User consent for applications, choose Allow user consent for apps from verified publishers for selected permissions (recommended).

Under Select permissions to allow, specify User.Read and User.ReadBasic.All, which correspond to User.Read and User.Read profile delegated permissions.

This ensures that users can only consent to applications accessing their basic profile data and no additional permissions beyond what’s explicitly approved.

Why not the other options:

A. Security defaults: Controls basic security policies (e.g., MFA, legacy authentication) — unrelated to app consent.

C. Permission classifications: Used for labeling permission risk levels but doesn’t enforce consent behavior.

D. Identity Protection settings: Related to risky user or sign-in detections, not app consent control.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Exam Ref SC-300, Azure AD Seamless Single Sign-On (SSO) allows users on corporate Windows 10 devices connected to the corporate network to automatically sign in to Azure AD-connected services such as Microsoft 365 or Azure without needing to re-enter their credentials.

Seamless SSO works by automatically signing users in using their on-premises Active Directory credentials when they are on the corporate network. This feature is enabled through Azure AD Connect and uses a service account (AZUREADSSOACC) to securely communicate authentication tokens.

However, for Azure AD Seamless SSO to function correctly on domain-joined Windows 10 computers, specific browser configurations are required. In particular, users must be able to automatically authenticate to the Azure AD SSO endpoint (https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com ).

The Microsoft documentation specifies:

“To enable Seamless SSO on Windows devices, ensure that the Azure AD SSO URL (https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com) is added to the Local intranet zone in Internet Explorer or Microsoft Edge (IE mode). This allows the browser to use the user’s current Windows credentials for integrated authentication without prompting.”

Therefore:

Option A (Modify the Local intranet zone settings) is correct — adding the Azure AD SSO URL to the Local intranet zone allows integrated Windows authentication to pass through automatically, enabling seamless sign-on.

Option B (Configure Sign-in options from the Settings app) applies to user-specific credential management but not domain-wide SSO configuration.

Option C (Enable Enterprise State Roaming) synchronizes settings and credentials across devices but does not enable seamless SSO.

Option D (Install the Azure AD Connect Authentication Agent) is used for Pass-through Authentication, not Seamless SSO.

From Microsoft Learn’s “Plan, deploy, and manage Azure AD Seamless SSO” module:

“To enable users to sign in automatically, configure the browsers and add the Azure AD SSO service URL to the Local intranet security zone. This ensures credentials are passed transparently for single sign-on.”

\QUESTION NO: 162 HOTSPOT

You have an Azure AD tenant and an Azure web app named App1.

You need to provide guest users with self-service sign-up for App1. The solution must meet the following requirements:

• Guest users must be able to sign up by using a one-time password.

• The users must provide their first name, last name, city, and email address during the sign-up process.

What should you configure in the Azure Active Directory admin center for each requirement? To answer, select the appropriate options in the answer area.

NOTE: Each correct selection is worth one point.

Answer:  One-time password: The External collaboration settings

 User details: A user flow

According to Microsoft’s official documentation and the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Study Guide, when configuring self-service sign-up for guest users in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) External Identities, there are two separate configuration areas that govern how users authenticate and what information they must provide:

To allow guest users who do not have Azure AD, Microsoft, or Google accounts to authenticate using a one-time passcode (OTP) sent to their email, you must enable this feature under External collaboration settings.

This configuration is found in the Azure AD admin center under:

Azure Active Directory → External Identities → External collaboration settings → One-time passcode for guests.

Microsoft documentation states:

“The one-time passcode feature in External collaboration settings enables guest users to authenticate by using a temporary code emailed to them when they sign in.”

Therefore, for the requirement “Guest users must be able to sign up by using a one-time password,” you must configure The External collaboration settings.

To collect specific user attributes such as first name, last name, city, and email address during self-service sign-up, you configure a user flow (also known as a sign-up/sign-in flow) under Azure AD B2C or External Identities user flows.

In the Azure AD admin center, navigate to:

Azure AD → External Identities → User flows → New user flow → Sign-up flow.

Within the flow, you define the attributes (like name, city, and email) that must be collected at registration.

Microsoft’s official Identity and Access Administrator materials explain:

“User flows in External Identities determine the user experience during sign-up and sign-in and allow administrators to collect custom attributes such as name, location, or other organization-specific details.”

\

To configure the account lockout settings so that accounts are locked out for five minutes after 10 failed sign-in attempts, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to the lockout settings:

Go to Security > Authentication methods > Password protection.

Adjust the Smart Lockout settings:

Set the Lockout threshold to 10 failed sign-in attempts.

Set the Lockout duration (in minutes) to 5.

Please note that by default, smart lockout locks an account from sign-in after 10 failed attempts in Azure Public and Microsoft Azure operated by 21Vianet tenants1. The lockout period is one minute at first, and longer in subsequent attempts.However, you can customize these settings tomeet your organization’s requirements if you have Microsoft Entra ID P1 or higher licenses for your users1.

According to Microsoft’s Azure Active Directory roles and permissions reference, the User Administrator role has the following capabilities:

Reset passwords for most non-admin users and certain administrative roles.

Manage user and group properties, including license assignments.

While the License Administrator can manage product licenses, they cannot reset user passwords. Conversely, the Helpdesk Administrator can reset passwords but not manage licenses. Therefore, the only role that satisfies both requirements (reset passwords and manage licenses) is User Administrator.

Microsoft documentation confirms:

“The User Administrator can manage all aspects of users and groups, including resetting passwords, monitoring service health, and assigning licenses.”

<  Statement 1 → No

 Statement 2 → No

 Statement 3 → Yes

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator study guide and Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) documentation, roles in PIM can be configured for eligible or active assignments.

User1 is assigned automatically – NoThe “Add assignments” screen shows User1’s assignment type as Eligible, not Active. Eligible assignments mean the user is not automatically granted the role; they must activate it manually when needed. Therefore, User1 is not assigned automatically to the Application Administrator role.

When User2 requests role assignment, only User3 can approve – NoThe Role setting details show that approval is required to activate and that the approver is listed as Group1. Because both User2 and User3 are members of Group1, any member of the group can approve the request, not only User3. Hence, the statement that only User3 can approve is incorrect.

User1’s approval on January 31, 2021, at 23:00 – YesThe configuration shows an activation maximum duration of 5 hours. Therefore, if User1’s request is approved at 23:00 on January 31, the role remains active for 5 hours — until 04:00 on February 1, 2021. This aligns precisely with the parameters displayed in the exhibit.

As confirmed in Microsoft documentation (“Configure role settings in Azure AD PIM”), activation settings define how long a user can remain active after approval, and group approvers allow any member of that group to approve activations.

To deploy Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for only the members of the Sg-Finance group, excluding Debra Berger, and without using a Conditional Access policy, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in as a Security Administrator or Global Administrator.

Navigate to MFA settings:

Go to Users > Active users.

On the Active users page, select Multi-factor authentication.

Manage user settings:

Find and select the Sg-Finance group.

Enable MFA for this group by setting the requirement status to Enabled.

Exclude a user from MFA:

In the Multi-factor authentication page, search for Debra Berger.

Set her MFA status to Disabled to exclude her from MFA registration.

Verify the configuration:

Ensure that all members of the Sg-Finance group have MFA enabled except for Debra Berger.

Communicate the change:

Inform the Sg-Finance group members about the MFA requirement and provide instructions on how to register for MFA.

Monitor the setup:

Check the sign-in logs to confirm that MFA is being prompted for the Sg-Finance group members and not for Debra Berger.

To implement a process for reviewing guest users’ access to the Salesforce app with the specified requirements, you can use Microsoft Entra’s Identity Governance access reviews feature. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Assign the appropriate role:

Ensure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, User Administrator, or Identity Governance Administrator1.

Navigate to Identity Governance:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center.

Go toIdentity governance>Access reviews1.

Create a new access review:

Select New access review.

Choose the Salesforce app to review guest user access1.

Configure the review settings:

Set the frequency of the review to monthly.

Define thedurationof the review period to5 days1.

Determine the reviewers:

Assign the manager of each guest user as the reviewer.

If a guest user does not have a manager, assignMegan Bowenas the reviewer1.

Automate the removal process:

Configure settings toautomatically remove accessif the review is not completed within the specified time frame1.

Monitor and enforce compliance:

Regularly check the access review results to ensure compliance with the review policy1.

Communicate the process:

Inform all stakeholders about the new review process and provide guidance on how to complete the reviews.

By following these steps, you can ensure that guest users’ access to the Salesforce app is reviewed monthly, with managers being responsible for the review, and access is removed if the review is not completed in time.

According to the Microsoft SC-300 Identity and Access Administrator Official Study Guide and Microsoft Learn – Manage administrative units in Azure AD module, Administrative Units (AUs) in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) are logical containers used to delegate administration to specific subsets of users and groups.

The User Administrator role can perform specific actions within the scope to which it is assigned. In this scenario:

Admin1 is assigned the User Administrator role scoped to the Department1 Administrative Unit, meaning Admin1 can only manage users and groups within that administrative unit.

User3 and User4 belong to Group2, but Group2 members are not part of Department1’s listed users (only User1 and User2 are). Therefore, Admin1 cannot reset the passwords of User3 or User4.

Additionally, Admin1 cannot add User1 to Group3 because Group3 is not included in Department1’s administrative scope. The administrator can only modify group memberships for groups within their AU.

Admin3 is assigned the User Administrator role at the directory (tenant-wide) scope, granting full privileges over all users and groups in the tenant. Therefore, Admin3 can reset User1’s password since the scope includes all users in the directory.

Microsoft documentation explicitly states:

“An administrative unit–scoped role grants the ability to manage only those users and groups within the administrative unit. Directory-scoped roles grant management across the entire tenant.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Publish on-premises apps for remote access using Azure AD Application Proxy”, Azure AD Application Proxy enables secure remote access to internal, on-premises web applications without requiring VPN access.

In the scenario, App1 is an on-premises application hosted within the Litware network, and the technical requirements specify that it must be securely accessible to both internal and external users — including Fabrikam guest accounts — through Azure AD authentication.

Microsoft’s official documentation states:

“Azure AD Application Proxy provides secure remote access to on-premises web applications, integrating with Azure AD for single sign-on (SSO) and conditional access policies.”

Given that the environment already includes a server (SERVER1) running the Azure AD Application Proxy connector, and that Litware wants to enforce Azure AD Conditional Access and MFA for App1, Azure AD Application Proxy is the correct implementation.

The other options are not suitable:

A. Policy set in Microsoft Endpoint Manager: Used for device compliance and app management, not for publishing on-premises apps.

B. App configuration policy in Endpoint Manager: Used for mobile app configuration (e.g., MAM policies), not for access publishing.

C. App registration in Azure AD: Used for modern cloud or SaaS apps integration, but App1 is on-premises and needs proxy access.

Correct Answer: D. Azure AD Application Proxy

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Manage user and group licenses in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD)”, when you need to automatically assign licenses to users based on specific attributes (such as department, location, or a custom attribute like LWLicenses), you should use a Dynamic User Security Group in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).

In the scenario, Litware wants to:

“Manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute. Users who have the appropriate value for LWLicenses must be added automatically to the Microsoft 365 group that has the appropriate license assigned.”

This requirement directly maps to a Dynamic User security group, which supports dynamic membership rules that automatically include users when their attributes meet defined conditions (for example, user.extensionAttribute15 -eq "E5"). When a license is assigned to this dynamic group, Azure AD automatically provisions or removes licenses for members based on their attribute values — eliminating manual license management.

Per Microsoft documentation:

“You can assign licenses to a group that has dynamic membership. When a user’s attributes change, Azure AD automatically adds or removes them from the group, which updates their license assignments accordingly.”

Now, analyzing the other options:

B. An OU (Organizational Unit): Used in on-premises Active Directory, not Azure AD. It cannot manage cloud-based license assignments.

C. A Distribution Group: Used for email distribution in Exchange Online; cannot be used for license assignment.

D. An Administrative Unit: Used for scoping administrative permissions, not for license assignment.

Therefore, the only object type that satisfies both the technical and automation requirements is a Dynamic User Security Group.

✅ Correct Answer: A. A Dynamic User security group

To meet auditing and monitoring requirements, Azure AD must send sign-in logs and audit logs to an external location such as a Log Analytics workspace, Azure Storage account, or Event Hub. This is configured using Diagnostics settings in Azure AD.

According to Microsoft documentation in “Monitor Azure Active Directory activity logs in Azure Monitor” and the SC-300 learning objective “Implement and monitor identity governance”, you must enable diagnostic settings to stream directory logs to a Log Analytics workspace.

The scenario specifies:

“You create a Log Analytics workspace. You need to implement the technical requirements for auditing.”

By configuring Azure AD’s Diagnostics settings, you can:

Send Sign-in logs, Audit logs, and Provisioning logs to Log Analytics.

Correlate identity events with security insights in Azure Sentinel or Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.

Microsoft documentation confirms:

“To collect and analyze Azure AD sign-in and audit data, configure diagnostic settings to send logs to Log Analytics.”

Other options do not meet the requirement:

A. Company branding: Only affects login pages, not logging or auditing.

C. External Identities: Controls guest access, not logging.

D. App registrations: Used for app integration, not auditing.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) official study guide and Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage user risk policies”, the scenario where “users must be forced to change their password if there is a probability that their identity was compromised” directly maps to the Azure AD Identity Protection “User risk policy.”

In Azure AD Identity Protection, user risk represents the likelihood that an account’s credentials have been compromised. When Azure AD detects a high user risk (for example, leaked credentials, atypical sign-in behavior, or sign-ins from unfamiliar locations), the User Risk Policy can be configured to automatically block access or require the user to reset their password upon the next sign-in.

Before a user can reset their password or complete remediation, they must have a registered authentication method (for password reset and MFA). Therefore, users must first register for multi-factor authentication (MFA) — this registration enables the authentication methods (like phone number or authenticator app) that are also used during password reset verification.

The SC-300 documentation specifically highlights:

“To enforce a password change when a user’s identity risk is high, the user must be registered for MFA, and a user risk policy must be configured to require password change.”

Thus, the correct configuration is:

Users must first register for MFA — to ensure they have verified methods available.

Configure a user risk policy — to automatically trigger password reset upon detection of compromised credentials.

Correct Answers:

Users must first: Register for multi-factor authentication (MFA).

You must configure: A user risk policy.

As per the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study materials and Microsoft Learn documentation on “Manage administrative units in Azure Active Directory”, Administrative Units (AUs) are designed to delegate administrative permissions within large organizations based on divisions such as geography or department. They provide scoped administrative control—allowing helpdesk or user administrators to manage users only within a specific subset of the directory, such as a branch office or department.

In this scenario, Contoso’s technical requirement states:

“The helpdesk administrators must be able to manage licenses for only the users in their respective office.”

To fulfill this, you must create an administrative unit for each branch office (e.g., Montreal, London, Seattle) and assign helpdesk administrators scoped to those AUs. This ensures that each helpdesk admin can only manage licenses for the users within their respective office, enforcing the principle of least privilege.

The Azure Active Directory admin center is the correct tool for creating and managing administrative units. SC-300 guidance clarifies that administrative units are Azure AD objects, not on-premises Active Directory objects like Organizational Units (OUs). Therefore, they are created and managed exclusively through the Azure portal, Microsoft Graph, or PowerShell for Azure AD, but the most straightforward interface for exam purposes is the Azure AD admin center.

 The users must first: Register for multi-factor authentication (MFA)

 You must configure: A user risk policy

According to Microsoft SC-300 official learning materials and Exam Ref SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator, when the requirement is to address the probability that user identities were compromised, the appropriate feature is Azure AD Identity Protection. Identity Protection detects risky sign-ins and risky users through continuous analysis of login behavior, location, device, and credential exposure signals.

Two types of policies can be created:

Sign-in risk policy – Triggers actions based on suspicious sign-in behavior (for example, unfamiliar location).

User risk policy – Triggers actions when the user’s overall identity is deemed at risk (for example, compromised credentials).

The documentation specifies:

“When user risk is detected, the policy can require the user to change their password to remediate the risk. Users must first be registered for MFA to perform secure password change operations.”

Therefore, before the user risk policy can be enforced, users must be enrolled in multi-factor authentication (MFA). MFA is used during the remediation step (password change) to verify the user’s identity securely.

Thus, to meet the requirement for “the probability that user identities were compromised,” you configure a user risk policy in Azure AD Identity Protection, and ensure that users first register for MFA so that they can complete password change or verification flows when risks are detected.

The SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect explains that when you need to bring in a new set of on-premises users or change what is synchronized (for example, adding an additional domain/OU such as ADatum or adjusting filtering), you reopen the Azure AD Connect wizard and choose “Customize synchronization options.” The guide notes that this path lets you “modify directory/OU filtering, add or remove forests, and enable optional sync features” so that only the intended users are synchronized. It contrasts with operational commands: Start-ADSyncSyncCycle merely triggers an immediate delta/full sync of the current configuration; Set-ADSyncScheduler changes the sync cadence or pause/resume behavior; and “Change user sign-in” alters the authentication method (e.g., PHS vs. PTA) but does not control scoping of which users are synced. To meet a requirement to sync the ADatum users according to technical constraints (such as OU/domain selection or feature toggles), you must first configure the scope by running the wizard and selecting Customize synchronization options, then perform/allow a sync cycle to bring those users into Azure AD as defined.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Exam Ref and the Azure AD Dynamic Membership Rules documentation, when you create a dynamic group in Azure Active Directory (now Entra ID), you define rules that automatically add or remove users based on their attributes.

The scenario requires a group named LWGroup1 that contains all Azure AD user accounts for Litware but excludes all guest accounts. In Azure AD, internal users created within the tenant are designated with the attribute user.userType = "Member", while external or guest accounts from partner organizations have user.userType = "Guest".

To ensure only internal (Litware) users are included, the membership rule must:

Ensure the user object exists — by checking (user.objectId -ne null) which confirms that the rule only applies to valid user objects.

Include only members, excluding guests — by filtering with (user.userType -eq "Member").

Hence, the dynamic rule that satisfies these conditions is:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

This rule guarantees that LWGroup1 dynamically includes all internal users from litware.com and excludes all external users or guest accounts (such as Fabrikam users).

This logic aligns precisely with the Microsoft Learn module “Manage groups in Azure Active Directory” and SC-300 study guide section “Implement and manage dynamic membership rules”, which states:

“Use user.userType to distinguish between internal members and external guests when configuring membership rules for dynamic groups.”

✅ Correct Answer:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Monitor and respond to Azure AD events with Azure Sentinel”, multi-staged attacks are advanced threat scenarios that require correlation of multiple events — for example, a suspicious sign-in followed by abnormal Office 365 activity.

The scenario in the question states:

“Litware wants to use the Fusion rule in Azure Sentinel to detect multi-staged attacks that include a combination of suspicious Azure AD sign-ins followed by anomalous Microsoft Office 365 activity.”

Azure Sentinel’s Fusion rule is a built-in, machine-learning–driven correlation rule that automatically detects multi-stage attacks by analyzing anomalies across multiple data sources such as Azure AD sign-in logs, Office 365 activity, and security alerts.

However, to fine-tune detection or meet specific organizational monitoring requirements, administrators can customize the rule logic in Sentinel analytics. This allows you to define how different signals and events are correlated, what thresholds trigger an alert, and how Sentinel interprets combined anomalies.

Microsoft documentation states:

“Fusion uses correlation logic in analytics rules to detect complex multi-stage attacks. Administrators can customize rule logic to meet specific detection requirements and fine-tune alert sensitivity.”

The other options do not meet the requirement:

B. Create a workbook → Used for visualization and reporting, not detection.

C. Add data connectors → Used to ingest data sources; this is already configured.

D. Add a playbook → Used for automated response, not for detection logic configuration.

✅ Correct Answer: A. Customize the Azure Sentinel rule logic

SC-300 materials stress that to enforce modern controls (like MFA) on on-premises apps, you must front them with Azure AD so Conditional Access can evaluate sign-ins. The documentation states that Azure AD Application Proxy “provides secure remote access to on-premises applications” and that apps published through it can have “Conditional Access policies, including multifactor authentication” applied at sign-in. In other words, once the legacy app is published by Application Proxy, Azure AD sits in the path, enabling you to meet the requirement to enforce MFA when accessing on-premises applications and to combine it with your location-based exemptions.

For SharePoint Online restrictions, SC-300 points to Microsoft Cloud App Security (Defender for Cloud Apps) for real-time governance: you can create session policies that “control and limit activities in real time” and, for SharePoint Online and other Microsoft 365 apps, “monitor user sessions and block download, cut, copy, and print” when conditions (device state, risk, or location) warrant it. Since the scenario already has anomaly detections enabled, configuring Cloud App Security policies aligns directly with the requirement to place access restrictions on SharePoint Online without altering tenant-wide consent settings. Thus, publish on-prem apps with Application Proxy to bring them under Conditional Access (for MFA), and use Cloud App Security policies to enforce SharePoint Online session and download controls.

SC-300 emphasizes using Conditional Access with named locations to scope MFA—especially to exclude trusted corporate egress IPs. The materials state that administrators can define named locations by public IP ranges and “mark them as trusted” for policy exceptions. This aligns with the requirement: enforce MFA for all users, but exempt users authenticating from the Boston office. Because Azure AD evaluates the client’s public egress address, private RFC1918 ranges are never seen by Azure AD on the internet, so defining private IP ranges would not work. Likewise, the legacy “Trusted IPs” setting belongs to the old per-user MFA service settings; SC-300 guidance prefers Conditional Access named locations for modern MFA deployments and for combining with other conditions (apps, platforms, user risk, locations). Implementing the Boston office as a named location using its public egress IP range(s), and marking it trusted, lets you exclude that location from the tenant-wide MFA policy while still meeting the broader requirement to enforce MFA for everyone else and for on-prem apps published via Azure AD Application Proxy. In short: define Boston’s public IP as a named location and use it in your Conditional Access policy exclusion to satisfy the exemption precisely and securely.

In SC-300, Azure AD Identity Protection is the prescribed control to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials.” That specific user risk—Leaked credentials—relies on Microsoft comparing known breached username/password pairs with what Azure AD can evaluate. The study materials explain that Identity Protection “detects leaked credentials when Microsoft finds a match with the user’s current credentials,” and also note that password hash synchronization (PHS) can be enabled even if your sign-in method is Pass-through Authentication or federation. A common exam call-out is that without PHS, Azure AD has no hash to compare, so the leaked-credential signal is unavailable. Enabling PHS (you can keep PTA as the active sign-in method) allows Identity Protection to raise user risk and enforce policy actions such as require password change or block access. By contrast, Azure AD Password Protection addresses banned/weak passwords at change time, not breached-credential telemetry; federation choices (e.g., PingFederate) don’t deliver the leaked-credential signal; and authentication method policy controls how users perform MFA (e.g., methods) rather than whether leaked credentials are detected. Therefore, to meet the requirement to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials,” the minimum correct step is to enable password hash synchronization while retaining PTA—exactly as recommended in SC-300 guidance.

In Azure AD Identity Governance, application access granted through Entitlement management is organized around catalogs and access packages. The SC-300 study materials explain that “a catalog is a container for resources and access packages” and that you must add your enterprise applications (or the groups tied to those apps) to a catalog before you can build access packages that users can request. Creating the catalog first enables you to place only the required resources in scope and to delegate day-to-day ownership: “catalog owners can manage the resources and access packages within their catalog without being tenant-wide admins,” satisfying the delegation requirement to use custom catalogs and least privilege. After the catalog exists, you create one or more access packages that include the application (or groups) and policies that control who can request, how they are approved, and for how long. Identity Governance then lets you track access package assignments and review who has the app over time. By contrast, programs are used to group and report on governance initiatives (for example, collections of access reviews) rather than to onboard application resources; and modifying user/admin consent settings affects app consent behavior, not the lifecycle tracking of assignments. Therefore, the correct first step to track application access assignments while meeting the delegation requirements is to create a catalog.

In the SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect and Identity Governance, Microsoft explains that to surface a custom on-premises attribute in Azure AD you must enable Directory extensions in Azure AD Connect. The guide states that “Directory extensions lets you synchronize additional attributes from on-premises Active Directory to Azure AD so they are available in the cloud directory for apps and policy.” This is the supported way to bring a custom attribute (here, LWLicenses) from the litware.com forest into Azure AD so it can be referenced by cloud features such as dynamic group rules. Domain filtering or optional features do not expose a new attribute to Azure AD; directory extensions does.

For license automation, the SC-300 materials on group-based licensing and dynamic groups emphasize that “licenses can be assigned to Azure AD groups; group members then inherit the licenses, and when membership changes, licenses are added or removed automatically.” They further note that “dynamic user groups evaluate rules against user attributes to add or remove users without manual effort,” and that “nested groups are not supported for license inheritance—only direct members receive licenses.” Using the synced LWLicenses attribute in a Dynamic User group rule (for example, user.extensionAttribute… -eq "E5") ensures users are automatically added to the correct group and therefore receive the specified licenses without administrative intervention, fully meeting Litware’s requirement to “manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn modules “Implement and manage Azure AD roles” and “Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM)”, there is a clear distinction between Azure AD built-in roles and Azure (resource-based) built-in roles.

Azure AD built-in roles govern directory-level access — such as managing users, groups, enterprise apps, or security settings in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).The Privileged Role Administrator role allows the user to manage role assignments for directory roles in Azure AD, including activating roles through PIM.The Global Administrator also has this capability, but the Privileged Role Administrator is the least privilege role that meets the delegation requirement — aligning with the principle of least privilege stated in the scenario.As the documentation notes:

“Privileged Role Administrator manages role assignments in Azure AD, including the ability to activate and assign roles through Azure AD Privileged Identity Management.”

Azure built-in roles, on the other hand, are used to control access at the Azure resource level — for subscriptions, resource groups, and individual resources.The role responsible for managing these assignments is the User Access Administrator.This role can grant or revoke access to Azure resources by managing role assignments within Azure RBAC (Role-Based Access Control).The Microsoft documentation states:

“User Access Administrator allows management of user access to Azure resources. It can assign roles in Azure RBAC for resources, subscriptions, and management groups.”

Therefore:

✅ To manage Azure AD built-in role assignments → Privileged role administrator

✅ To manage Azure built-in role assignments → User access administrator

This approach satisfies the delegation requirement mentioned in the scenario by assigning the least-privileged roles necessary for each type of role management task.

Server1

On DC1

Azure AD Password Protection has two components: the DC agent (installed on domain controllers) and the proxy service (installed on one or more member servers). The SC-300 materials and Microsoft Identity Governance guidance explain that the proxy service is required when domain controllers do not have direct internet access. The proxy retrieves the password protection policy and custom banned password list from Azure AD over outbound HTTPS and makes it available to DC agents. The documentation further states that you should deploy at least one proxy per forest and two for high availability, and that domain controllers do not need internet connectivity when a proxy is deployed. In this scenario, DCs are explicitly blocked from internet access, so the proxy must be placed on member servers. Both SERVER1 (Application Proxy connector) and SERVER2 (Azure AD Connect) are domain-joined member servers with internet connectivity and are appropriate locations for the AzureADPasswordProtectionProxy service; selecting both provides the recommended redundancy. The custom banned password list is configured in Azure AD at the tenant level (as part of Azure AD Password Protection settings), not on individual servers. Once configured, the policy and list are downloaded by the proxy and enforced by the DC agent during password set or change operations, satisfying the requirement to implement a banned password list for the litware.com forest.