CCCS-203b CrowdStrike Certified Cloud Specialist Questions and Answers

In CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security, exclusions for cloud scans are designed to be precise and scalable so that organizations can safely reduce noise without weakening overall security coverage. According to CrowdStrike best practices,tagsare the recommended and supported criterion for creating cloud scan exclusions.

Tags are metadata labels applied to cloud resources (such as AWS accounts, instances, or services) and are commonly used for ownership, environment classification (for example, dev, test, or prod), or application grouping. By using tags as exclusion criteria, security teams can dynamically control which resources are excluded from scans without relying on static identifiers. This is especially important in cloud environments where resources are frequently created, modified, or terminated.

Exclusions based onaccounts,regions, orservicesare broader in scope and can unintentionally exclude large portions of the environment, increasing the risk of blind spots. Tag-based exclusions allow CrowdStrike Falcon to maintain least-privilege security principles by excluding only explicitly labeled resources.

Because Falcon continuously evaluates cloud resources, tag-based exclusions automatically apply to newly created assets that inherit the same tag, ensuring consistent policy enforcement. For these reasons, CrowdStrike documentation and operational guidance identifyTagas the correct and most effective criterion for creating cloud scan exclusions.

To identify issues related to anoverprivileged cloud identity, CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security directs users toCloud Indicators of Misconfiguration (CIM). These indicators focus specifically on risky configurations, including excessive permissions, overly broad IAM roles, and violations of least-privilege principles.

By filtering Cloud Indicators of Misconfiguration for the specific identity, security teams can quickly identify misaligned permissions such as wildcard actions, unused privileges, or access that exceeds the role’s intended function. This view is purpose-built for identifying configuration risk—not active attacks or behavioral anomalies.

Cloud Indicators of Attack (CIA)are used to detect suspicious or malicious activity, not static permission risk.Investigate User Searchfocuses on observed behavior rather than permission design.Falcon Users Roles and Permissionsapplies to Falcon console access, not cloud-provider IAM identities.

Therefore, the correct and CrowdStrike-aligned approach is to reviewCloud Indicators of Misconfigurationfor the identity in question.

When remediation capacity is limited,CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Securityemphasizesrisk-based prioritizationfocused onactual exposurerather than theoretical severity alone.

Filtering vulnerabilities bycontainer running statusallows teams to identify which vulnerable images areactively running and exposed, particularly those that arepublic-facing. Remediating vulnerabilities in running containers first reduces real-world risk immediately, while dormant or unused images can be addressed later.

CVSS scores and CVE age do not account for exploit accessibility or operational exposure. Taking the business offline is impractical and unnecessary when targeted remediation can significantly reduce risk.

Therefore, the correct and CrowdStrike-aligned approach is tofilter by container running status, makingOption Dthe correct answer.

CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security supportsscheduled reportingas the preferred mechanism for automatically distributing security findings to stakeholders who may not have direct access to the Falcon console. When container vulnerabilities need to be reviewed on aweekly basis, the correct and most operationally efficient approach is tocreate a scheduled report covering the last 7 days.

Scheduled reports can be configured to run automatically and delivered via email to designated recipients, including users without Falcon console access. This makes them ideal for cross-functional teams, auditors, or management who require regular visibility into container risk without interactive access.

UsingAdvanced Event Searchrequires console access and manual execution, which does not meet the requirement for automatic distribution. Dashboards also require console access and cannot be securely shared externally. A 24-hour report would not align with the stated weekly review cadence and could result in incomplete visibility.

CrowdStrike documentation and best practices recommend scheduled reports for recurring compliance, vulnerability, and risk reporting use cases. Therefore, the correct solution is tocreate a scheduled report to list vulnerable container data from the last 7 days.

To notify your team when anew executable is downloaded and executed inside a running container, you must use aruntime-focused triggerin Falcon Fusion. The correct selection isContainer detection > Container runtime detection.

Container runtime detections monitor live container behavior, including process execution, file writes, network activity, and binary downloads. When an executable is introduced and run at runtime, this represents potential malicious activity or policy violation that cannot be detected during image assessment.

Image Assessmenttriggers apply only to pre-runtime image scanning and cannot detect runtime execution.Container drift detectionfocuses on changes to container state relative to the original image but does not specifically target execution-based detections.

CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security documentation clearly distinguishes runtime detections as the correct signal source for SOAR automation involving live container behavior. Therefore, the correct trigger configuration isContainer detection > Container runtime detection.

When troubleshooting issues with cloud account registrations in CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security, thefirst stepshould be toverify the email verification process. Cloud account registration workflows rely on confirmation emails for validation, authorization, and completion of onboarding steps.

If verification emails are delayed, blocked, or misrouted due to email filtering, domain restrictions, or misconfigured mail settings, the registration process can appear to fail even though the underlying configuration is correct. Checking this process is non-disruptive and often resolves the issue quickly.

Resetting user passwords or disabling registration features are intrusive actions that should only be taken after basic validation steps are completed. CrowdStrike best practices emphasize starting with low-impact troubleshooting actions before making broader changes.

Therefore, confirming that users are receiving and completing verification emails is the correct and recommended first step.

When registering an AWS account with CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security, enabling real-time visibility and detection is recommended to improve overall security posture. This ensures continuous monitoring of cloud activity, identities, and resources rather than relying solely on periodic posture assessments.

Real-time detection allows Falcon to identify risky behavior, misconfigurations, and attack techniques as they occur, reducing dwell time and improving response effectiveness. The other options are not registration-specific security enhancements within Falcon.

Therefore, the correct answer is Real-time visibility and detection.

During thecloud inventory phase of image assessmentinCrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security, the platform performs a deep, non-runtime analysis of container images to establish a complete software and binary inventory. This phase is designed to build visibility and context before vulnerability analysis or enforcement occurs.

Falcon expandsall container image layersto inspect their contents individually. This layered expansion is critical because vulnerabilities and malicious artifacts can exist in any layer, including inherited base images. During this process, Falcon collectscryptographic hashes for all binary objectsfound within the image. These hashes allow Falcon to uniquely identify binaries, correlate them with known threats, and support future detection and investigation workflows.

In addition to binary hashing, Falcon enumerates andlists operating system (OS) packagesinstalled in the image. This includes system libraries and dependencies provided by the base operating system, which are essential for accurate vulnerability mapping and exposure analysis later in the assessment lifecycle.

Importantly,vulnerability identification does not occur during the inventory phase. That activity is handled in subsequent analysis stages. The inventory phase focuses exclusively onexpansion, identification, and catalogingof image contents to ensure complete visibility and accuracy.

Therefore, the correct answer isOption C, as it precisely reflects the documented activities performed during the cloud inventory phase of image assessment in CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security.

If the primary concern is adversaries obtainingadministrator or elevated privileges, the first Cloud Identity Analyzer category to review isPrivilege Escalation. This category focuses on techniques and misconfigurations that allow attackers to gain higher-level permissions than initially granted.

Privilege escalation in cloud environments often involves overly permissive IAM roles, abuse of service principals, misconfigured trust relationships, or exploitation of identity federation mechanisms. CrowdStrike Cloud Identity Analyzer maps these behaviors to established attack frameworks and highlights identities that could be abused to gain admin-level access.

Other categories address different stages of the attack lifecycle.Executionfocuses on running malicious actions,Persistenceon maintaining access, andDefense Evasionon hiding activity. While all are important, privilege escalation represents the most direct path to full environment compromise.

Therefore, the correct starting point isPrivilege Escalation.

The secure and recommended way to test whether firewall restrictions are causing CSPM operation failures is to verify that the required CrowdStrike IP addresses are allowlisted. Falcon Cloud Security relies on outbound API communication between CrowdStrike and the cloud provider. If firewall rules block this traffic, asset inventory collection and IOM detection can fail even though registration appears successful.

CrowdStrike publishes a list of IP addresses and endpoints that must be permitted for proper operation. Validating firewall allowlists against this documentation is a low-risk, best-practice troubleshooting step that preserves security controls while testing connectivity assumptions.

Temporarily opening firewalls to all inbound traffic is insecure and strongly discouraged. Dismissing firewall-related causes without validation can delay resolution. Therefore, the correct and secure approach is to check that the CrowdStrike IP addresses are allowlisted.

InCrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security, configuration policy breaches aligned to regulatory and security frameworks such asNISTare tracked asIndicators of Misconfiguration (IOMs). These findings represent deviations from best-practice configurations and compliance benchmarks.

To provide an auditable list of NIST-related configuration violations, the correct location isExport Cloud Posture – Indicators of misconfiguration. This export includes detailed records of misconfigured resources, associated benchmarks (NIST, CIS, etc.), affected cloud accounts, severity, and remediation guidance. It is specifically designed to support internal and external audit requirements.

Cloud Indicators of Attack focus on threat activity, not compliance. Remediation status reports focus on fix progress rather than raw policy violations. The Cloud Posture dashboard provides a high-level summary but does not deliver the detailed, exportable list required for audits.

Therefore,Export Cloud Posture – Indicators of misconfigurationis the correct and documented source.

Falcon Cloud Security categorizes IOAs usingMITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques, enriched withcloud-provider contextto accurately represent cloud-native attack behavior.

To identifyDefense Evasion via Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Toolsactivity specifically withinAzure, analysts must filter IOAs usingMITRE Tactic and Techniquewhile also scoping the environment to thecloud provider. This ensures visibility into attacker behaviors such as disabling logging, modifying security services, or impairing monitoring controls at the cloud-provider level.

Filtering by attack type alone lacks the structured MITRE mapping required for accurate investigative workflows. Service-level filters are insufficient because impairment of defenses in cloud environments often impacts provider-managed services rather than individual workloads.

Therefore,MITRE Tactic and Technique – Cloud provideris the correct and most precise filter to identify Azure-specific defense evasion IOAs.

To secure an AWS Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) cluster running on Amazon Linux 2–based EC2 instanceswith container-level visibility, CrowdStrike Falcon documentation identifies theFalcon Container Sensor for Linuxas the correct solution. This sensor is part of Falcon Cloud Security and is purpose-built to protect Kubernetes and containerized workloads.

The Falcon Container Sensor for Linux is deployed as a container (commonly as a DaemonSet) on each Kubernetes worker node. It integrates with the underlying Linux kernel to observe container runtime activity while maintaining Kubernetes awareness. This allows CrowdStrike to deliver deep visibility into container processes, file system activity, network connections, and inter-container behavior—capabilities that are not available with host-only sensors.

TheFalcon Sensor for Linuxprotects the EC2 host operating system but does not provide container-aware telemetry or Kubernetes context. TheFalcon Kubernetes Admission Controlleris a pre-runtime control used to enforce image and deployment policies at admission time, not to provide runtime detection.Image Assessment at Runtimeis a feature for evaluating container images and is not a deployable sensor.

Because the requirement explicitly includesruntime protection and container-level visibility within EKS, the Falcon Container Sensor for Linux is the only option that fully satisfies these needs according to CrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security architecture and documentation.

InCrowdStrike Falcon Cloud Security, IOAs are categorized usingMITRE ATT&CK-aligned tacticsto help analysts quickly identify attacker objectives. When investigating how a threat actor may havemaintained accessto cloud resources after an initial breach, the appropriate tactic to focus on isPersistence.

Persistence IOAs represent techniques such as creating backdoor IAM roles, modifying access policies, adding API keys, enabling long-lived credentials, or altering cloud configurations to survive reboots or credential rotation. Filtering the IOA dashboard byPersistenceisolates these behaviors, enabling faster root-cause analysis and remediation.

Other filters serve different investigative purposes. Execution focuses on initial code execution, Privilege Escalation highlights elevation of permissions, and Ransomware identifies encryption-related activity. None of these specifically address long-term access maintenance.

Therefore, filtering byPersistenceis the correct and most effective way to identify IOAs related to maintaining access within cloud environments.