SOA-C03 AWS Certified CloudOps Engineer - Associate Questions and Answers

In this scenario, the EC2 instances pass their EC2 status checks, indicating that the operating system is responsive. However, the application hosted on the instance is failing intermittently, returning HTTP 500 errors. This demonstrates a discrepancy between the instance-level health and the application-level health.

According to AWS CloudOps best practices under Monitoring, Logging, Analysis, Remediation and Performance Optimization (SOA-C03 Domain 1), Auto Scaling groups should incorporate Elastic Load Balancing (ELB) health checks instead of relying solely on EC2 status checks. The ELB health check probes the application endpoint (for example, HTTP or HTTPS target group health checks), ensuring that the application itself is functioning correctly.

When an instance fails an ELB health check, Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling will automatically mark the instance as unhealthy and replace it with a new one, ensuring continuous availability and performance optimization.

Extract from AWS CloudOps (SOA-C03) Study Guide – Domain 1:

“Implement monitoring and health checks using ALB and EC2 Auto Scaling integration. Application Load Balancer health checks allow Auto Scaling to terminate and replace instances that fail application-level health checks, ensuring consistent application performance.”

Extract from AWS Auto Scaling Documentation:

“When you enable the ELB health check type for your Auto Scaling group, Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling considers both EC2 status checks and Elastic Load Balancing health checks to determine instance health. If an instance fails the ELB health check, it is automatically replaced.”

Therefore, the correct answer is B, as it ensures proper application-level monitoring and remediation using ALB-integrated ELB health checks—a core CloudOps operational practice for proactive incident response and availability assurance.

References (AWS CloudOps Verified Source Extracts):

AWS Certified CloudOps Engineer – Associate (SOA-C03) Exam Guide: Domain 1 – Monitoring, Logging, and Remediation.

AWS Auto Scaling User Guide: Health checks for Auto Scaling instances (Elastic Load Balancing integration).

AWS Well-Architected Framework – Operational Excellence and Reliability Pillars.

AWS Elastic Load Balancing Developer Guide – Target group health checks and monitoring.

AWS Config supports automatic remediation for both managed and custom rules. When a resource is found noncompliant, AWS Config can automatically invoke an AWS Systems Manager Automation document to remediate the issue. The managed automation document AWS-DisableIncomingSSHOnPort22 is specifically designed to remove unrestricted SSH access (0.0.0.0/0) from security group inbound rules.

This approach is the most operationally efficient because it requires no custom code, no event orchestration, and no ongoing maintenance. The remediation runs immediately when AWS Config detects noncompliance and ensures consistent enforcement of security policy across all applicable resources.

Options A, C, and D rely on Lambda functions and event-driven glue logic, which significantly increase operational overhead, complexity, and long-term maintenance costs. These approaches are unnecessary when AWS provides a fully managed remediation capability.

Therefore, configuring an automatic remediation action directly on the AWS Config rule is the correct and most efficient solution.

An Auto Scaling warm pool keeps pre-initialized instances in a stopped or running state, allowing them to be quickly attached to the Auto Scaling group when scaling events occur. This significantly reduces scale-out latency caused by long bootstrapping scripts.

Unlike increasing the minimum instance count, warm pools do not permanently overprovision resources. Predictive scaling improves timing but does not eliminate boot time delays.

Therefore, warm pools provide the fastest scale-out with minimal cost overhead.

For IPv4 traffic, private subnets require a NAT gateway in a public subnet to access the internet. NAT gateways must be deployed in public subnets and associated with an Elastic IP address. Private subnet route tables must direct 0.0.0.0/0 traffic to the NAT gateway.

The question states that NAT gateways are incorrectly placed in private subnets, which cannot provide internet access. Deploying NAT gateways in public subnets resolves this issue and restores outbound connectivity to external APIs.

Option A applies only to IPv6. Option B adds unnecessary complexity. Option D is not applicable because external APIs are not AWS services.

AWS Trusted Advisor publishes service quota metrics to Amazon CloudWatch. These metrics can be monitored using CloudWatch alarms, which support threshold-based alerting. By creating a CloudWatch alarm for each service quota metric, the CloudOps engineer can trigger alerts when usage exceeds 60%.

Amazon SNS is the AWS-native service for email notifications. CloudWatch alarms integrate directly with SNS, making this the most straightforward solution. SNS supports email subscriptions without additional infrastructure.

Options B and C incorrectly use SQS for email notifications, which requires additional processing and does not natively send emails. Option D relies on the AWS Health Dashboard, which does not support configurable threshold-based alerts for service quotas.

Therefore, CloudWatch alarms combined with SNS provide the correct and most efficient solution.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Documents:

The correct answers are B and D. AWS CloudOps documentation clearly states that AWS Secrets Manager is the recommended service for storing and managing database credentials securely. Secrets Manager integrates natively with Amazon RDS and supports automatic, scheduled secret rotation.

To rotate credentials weekly, Secrets Manager requires a Lambda rotation function. AWS provides managed rotation templates for Amazon RDS for MySQL that update the database password and the stored secret atomically. This combination ensures credentials are protected, rotated automatically, and audited with minimal operational effort.

Option A is incorrect because RDS Proxy does not store or rotate credentials; it only retrieves them from Secrets Manager. Option C is incorrect because Systems Manager Parameter Store does not support native automatic rotation. Option E is incorrect because Automation runbooks are not the recommended mechanism for secrets rotation and add unnecessary complexity.

AWS CloudOps best practices strongly recommend Secrets Manager with Lambda-based rotation for database credential protection and compliance.

EC2 does not publish RAM utilization as a native CloudWatch metric by default. Memory metrics such as mem_used_percent are typically collected by the CloudWatch Agent, which runs on the instance and publishes custom metrics to CloudWatch. Because the requirement is RAM utilization at 5-minute intervals, the CloudWatch Agent can be configured to emit metrics at that cadence (or faster).

“Detailed monitoring” for EC2 mainly affects EC2-provided metrics (like CPU) by changing the period from 5 minutes (basic) to 1 minute (detailed). It does not magically provide memory utilization. Therefore, the key requirement is installing/configuring the CloudWatch Agent and ensuring it has permissions to publish metrics (via an IAM role attached to the instance / instance profile).

Option C correctly combines: (1) basic monitoring (fine for the ask), (2) CloudWatch Agent to publish mem_used_percent, (3) IAM role permissions to allow publishing, and (4) Auto Scaling policy that scales based on the memory metric.

Option B incorrectly implies detailed monitoring provides mem_used_percent (it does not). Option D assumes a “standard” memory metric exists without the agent, which is not correct. Option A references mem_active, which is not the typical metric name exposed by CloudWatch Agent’s standard memory measurements for scaling policies, and also omits the IAM role requirement needed for publishing custom metrics.

Thus, C is the AWS-correct path for memory-based scaling using CloudWatch custom metrics.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Documents:

With the Managed-CachingDisabled policy, CloudFront is configured to minimize edge caching, so the remaining caching behavior users experience often comes from browser (client-side) caching. If users refresh and still see old content, it typically indicates the browser is allowed to reuse a cached copy without revalidating. The correct fix is to control client caching using HTTP response headers on the S3 object.

Adding a Cache-Control: max-age=0 header instructs browsers that the object becomes stale immediately and should be revalidated on subsequent requests (often resulting in conditional requests using If-Modified-Since or ETag behavior). This preserves correctness—users will fetch or revalidate the latest file—without requiring heavier operational actions like frequent CloudFront invalidations or changing to an optimized caching policy that may increase edge caching.

Option B can worsen the issue by increasing caching if object headers permit it. Option C is unrelated; versioning affects object history and recovery, not browser cache behavior. Option D affects payload size transfer (gzip/brotli), not cache freshness.

EC2 Image Builder is a managed service that automates the creation, testing, vulnerability scanning, and distribution of AMIs. It supports scheduled image pipelines, which makes it ideal for weekly application updates.

Image Builder integrates with Amazon Inspector to perform vulnerability scans during image creation, fulfilling the security requirement. Custom image recipes define application dependencies and installation steps, ensuring consistency across deployments.

Manual AMI creation, cron-based scripts, or direct API calls require ongoing maintenance and do not natively support vulnerability scanning.

Therefore, EC2 Image Builder is the most operationally efficient solution.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Documents:

The requirement is to fix performance degradation from predictable peak CPU load without service disruptions. The most reliable and operationally standard approach is horizontal scaling with an Auto Scaling group driven by CloudWatch metrics/alarms (or target tracking). Launching additional instances and distributing traffic (typically behind a load balancer) increases capacity while keeping existing instances serving requests—no reboot or stop/start required.

Option D meets the requirement because Auto Scaling can add capacity when CPU exceeds a threshold and remove capacity when demand falls. This improves performance during peak periods and maintains availability. It is also operationally efficient: scaling actions are automated, consistent, and can be tuned with cooldowns/health checks.

Options A and C describe vertical scaling (instance resize). Resizing an EC2 instance type generally requires stopping the instance, changing the type, and starting it again—this is disruptive for a single-instance web server and often causes downtime. Option B (restarting the application) directly introduces disruption and does not address underlying capacity constraints; it can also worsen customer impact during peaks.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Doocuments:

Amazon Aurora supports up to 15 Aurora Replicas that share the same storage volume and provide read scaling and improved availability. Official guidance states that replicas “offload read traffic from the writer” and that you should direct read-only workloads to the reader endpoint, reducing CPU pressure and connection counts on the primary. Aurora also supports Replica Auto Scaling through Application Auto Scaling policies using metrics such as CPU utilization or connections to add or remove replicas automatically. This design addresses both high CPU and maximum connections by moving reporting traffic to read replicas while keeping a single write primary for OLTP. Option B creates a separate cluster with independent storage, increasing operational overhead and data synchronization complexity. Options C and D introduce application-layer caching changes that may not guarantee data freshness or relieve the write node directly. Therefore, adding read replicas and routing reporting to the reader endpoint, with auto scaling based on load, is the least intrusive, CloudOps-aligned way to stabilize performance.

EC2 Instance Connect Endpoint (EICE) enables secure SSH access to instances in private subnets without requiring public IP addresses, bastion hosts, or inbound internet access. By deploying the endpoint in the private subnet, administrators can connect securely using IAM-based authentication.

The instance security group must allow inbound SSH (port 22) from the EICE security group. Access control is handled via IAM, which eliminates the need to distribute or manage SSH keys.

Option B incorrectly attempts to use Systems Manager for SSH, which is unnecessary when EICE is available. Option C incorrectly places the endpoint in a public subnet, which does not align with the requirement to keep access private. Option D is incorrect because Systems Manager Session Manager does not require SSH and AmazonEC2ReadOnlyAccess does not allow instance access.

EICE provides the least overhead and most secure SSH access path for private EC2 instances.

Per the AWS Cloud Operations and Security Automation documentation, Security Hub integrates with Amazon EventBridge to publish findings in real time. These events can trigger automated responses using AWS Lambda functions or AWS Systems Manager Automation runbooks.

In this scenario, the correct CloudOps approach is to configure the existing EventBridge rule to invoke a Lambda function that inspects the event payload, identifies the affected security group, and removes the offending inbound rule (e.g., port 21 open to 0.0.0.0/0).

This event-driven remediation provides continuous compliance and eliminates manual intervention. Cron jobs (Options B and C) contradict event-driven design and add operational overhead. Stopping instances (Option A) doesn’t address the root cause — the insecure security group.

Thus, Option D aligns with AWS best practices for automated security remediation through EventBridge and Lambda.

Amazon S3 Object Lock in compliance mode provides immutable storage that prevents objects from being deleted or overwritten for a defined retention period. In compliance mode, even the root user cannot remove the retention or delete the object before the retention period expires. This makes it suitable for regulatory and strict data-protection requirements.

Because Object Lock must be enabled at bucket creation time, a new bucket is required. Setting a retention period of 3 months ensures that backups cannot be deleted before that time under any circumstances.

Option D (governance mode) allows privileged users to bypass retention, which violates the strict “must not be deleted” requirement. Option A relies on IAM policy changes, which are reversible and error-prone. Option C does not prevent deletion; versioning only retains previous versions if objects are deleted, but users can still delete versions unless additional controls are applied.

Therefore, S3 Object Lock in compliance mode is the correct and most secure solution.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Documents:

To meet the requirement to log and audit any principal that publishes to SNS topics and interacts with SQS queues, the correct service is AWS CloudTrail, because CloudTrail records API activity (who did what, when, and from where). Enabling data events (where supported/required for deeper visibility) provides detailed records for operations such as publishing messages and sending/receiving messages. Delivering CloudTrail logs to Amazon S3 provides durable retention and supports querying workflows.

To ensure that communication uses VPC endpoints, the company should configure VPC endpoints for SNS and SQS and then validate usage by inspecting CloudTrail event records. CloudTrail includes endpoint-related context fields (for example, a VPC endpoint identifier) that allow auditors to confirm that the request path used a VPC endpoint rather than traversing the public internet. This directly addresses the “must use VPC endpoints” control with auditable evidence.

The other options do not satisfy both requirements. CloudWatch Logs does not automatically capture SNS/SQS API caller identity for publish/send/receive operations in the same authoritative way CloudTrail does. EventBridge can capture service events but is not the primary audit log of API calls and does not inherently prove VPC endpoint usage per request. Inspecting a VPC endpoint field in CloudWatch Logs is not the standard audit mechanism for these API calls.

Per the AWS Cloud Operations and Service Catalog documentation, when a portfolio is shared across AWS accounts, the recipient account imports the shared portfolio.

The recipient CloudOps engineer cannot modify the original products or their configurations but can:

Add products from the imported portfolio into their local portfolios for deployment,

Control end-user access in the recipient account, and

Manage local constraints or permissions.

However, the recipient cannot edit, delete, or reconfigure the shared products (Options B, C, and D). The source (owner) account retains full administrative control over products, launch roles, and lifecycle policies.

This model aligns with AWS CloudOps principles of centralized governance with distributed self-service deployment across multiple accounts.

Thus, Option A is correct—imported portfolios allow the recipient to add products to a local portfolio but not alter the shared configuration.

As documented in AWS Cloud Operations and Database Recovery, Aurora Backtrack allows you to rewind the existing database cluster to a chosen point in time without creating a new cluster. This feature supports fine-grained rollback for accidental data changes, making it ideal for scenarios like table deletions or logical corruption.

Backtracking maintains continuous transaction logs and permits rewinding within a configurable window (up to 72 hours). It does not require creating a new cluster or endpoint, and it preserves the same production environment, fulfilling the operational requirement for in-place recovery.

In contrast, Point-in-Time Recovery (Option D) always creates a new cluster, while replica promotion (Option A) and Lambda restoration (Option B) are unrelated to immediate rollback operations.

Therefore, Option C, using Aurora Backtrack, best meets the requirement for same-cluster restoration and minimal downtime.

Auto Scaling groups with target tracking scaling policies automatically adjust capacity based on real-time demand. This solution is ideal for handling unpredictable and random traffic spikes.

Target tracking scaling maintains a metric, such as average CPU utilization or request count per target, at a defined target value. The Auto Scaling group automatically launches or terminates instances as traffic fluctuates.

Manual scaling, EventBridge-based scaling, or scheduled scaling do not respond dynamically to random traffic patterns.

Therefore, an Auto Scaling group with a target tracking scaling policy is the correct solution.

CloudFormation StackSets are designed specifically to deploy and manage the same CloudFormation stack across multiple AWS accounts and Regions from a centralized administration point. When accounts are managed under AWS Organizations, StackSets can integrate directly with Organizations to target Organizational Units (OUs) or specific accounts, which minimizes operational overhead. This removes the need to manually assume roles and deploy stacks one-by-one, and avoids building custom automation (Lambda + cross-account role assumption + account enumeration + error handling + retries + idempotency).

With StackSets, you define the template once and then create stack instances across many accounts in a controlled and consistent manner. StackSets provide built-in features for: (1) centralized rollout and updates, (2) drift detection, (3) automatic deployment to new accounts (when using Organizations integration), and (4) standardized execution roles. This is operationally simpler and safer than scripting because StackSets handle orchestration and track deployment state per account/Region.

Option A increases manual work and is error-prone at scale. Options B and C require custom Lambda orchestration, cross-account permissions, and ongoing maintenance for failure modes and change management. StackSets provide the native “least ops” approach to multi-account CloudFormation deployments under Organizations.

The AWS Cloud Operations and Monitoring documentation specifies that the Amazon CloudWatch Agent is the recommended tool for collecting system and application logs from EC2 instances. The agent pushes these logs into a centralized CloudWatch Logs group, providing durable storage and real-time monitoring.

Once the logs are centralized, a CloudWatch Metric Filter can be configured to search for specific error keywords (for example, “ERROR” or “FAILURE”). This filter transforms matching log entries into custom metrics. From there, a CloudWatch Alarm can monitor the metric threshold and publish notifications to an Amazon SNS topic, which can send email or SMS alerts to subscribed recipients.

This combination provides a fully automated, managed, and serverless solution for log aggregation and error alerting. It eliminates the need for manual cron jobs (Option B), custom scripts (Option D), or Lambda-based log streaming (Option C).

AWS CloudOps governance best practices emphasize centralized account management and preventive guardrails. AWS Control Tower integrates directly with AWS Organizations and provides “Region deny controls” and “Service Control Policies (SCPs)” that apply automatically to all existing and newly created member accounts. SCPs are organization-wide guardrails that define the maximum permissions for accounts. They can explicitly deny actions such as launching EC2 instances in a specific Region, or block root user access.

To prevent CloudTrail log deletion, SCPs can also include denies on cloudtrail:DeleteTrail and s3:DeleteObject actions targeting the CloudTrail log S3 bucket. These SCPs ensure that no user, including administrators, can violate the compliance requirements.

AWS documentation under the Security and Compliance domain for CloudOps states:

“Use AWS Control Tower to establish a secure, compliant, multi-account environment with preventive guardrails through service control policies and detective controls through AWS Config.”

This approach meets all stated needs: centralized enforcement, automatic propagation to new accounts, region-based restrictions, and immutable audit logs. Options A, B, and D either detect violations reactively or lack complete enforcement and automation across future accounts.

Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) are Region-specific. An AMI ID that exists in us-west-2 does not automatically exist in eu-west-1. If a CloudFormation template references a hardcoded AMI ID from one Region, stack creation in another Region will fail when that AMI cannot be found.

Additionally, not all AWS services or service features are available in every AWS Region. If the template includes a resource type or feature that is unsupported in eu-west-1, CloudFormation will fail during stack creation.

IAM users are global resources, not Region-specific, so Option A is incorrect. Permission issues would typically fail immediately and are not Region-dependent. Option E is incorrect because CloudFormation can both create and update resources.

Therefore, Region-specific AMIs and unavailable services are the valid reasons for failure.

According to the AWS Cloud Operations and Disaster Recovery documentation, the active-active multi-Region architecture provides the lowest possible RTO and RPO among all disaster recovery strategies. In this approach, workloads are deployed and actively running in multiple AWS Regions simultaneously. All data is continuously replicated in real time between Regions using fully managed replication services, ensuring zero data loss (zero RPO).

Because both Regions are active and capable of handling requests, failover between them is instantaneous, meeting the RTO of less than 10 minutes. Amazon Route 53 is used with weighted or latency-based routing policies and health checks to automatically route traffic away from an impaired Region to the healthy Region without manual intervention.

In contrast:

Pilot Light Architecture maintains only a minimal copy of the environment in the secondary Region. It requires time to scale up infrastructure during a disaster, resulting in longer RTO and potential data loss (non-zero RPO).

Warm Standby Architecture keeps partially running infrastructure in the secondary Region. Although faster than pilot light, it still requires scaling and synchronization, resulting in higher RTO and RPO compared to active-active.

Backup and Restore (option D) relies on periodic backups and restores data when needed. This approach has the highest RTO and RPO, unsuitable for mission-critical workloads demanding high availability and zero data loss.

Therefore, based on AWS-recommended disaster recovery strategies outlined in the AWS Cloud Operations and Disaster Recovery Guide, the Active-Active Multi-Region architecture (Option C) is the only approach that guarantees RTO <10 minutes and RPO = 0, achieving continuous availability and business continuity across Regions.

Amazon EBS snapshots are stored in Amazon S3, and standard restores can experience higher latency until data blocks are fully retrieved. Fast Snapshot Restore (FSR) eliminates this latency by ensuring that all blocks are immediately available at full performance.

Because the production environment uses a General Purpose SSD (gp3) volume, creating the test database on the same volume type ensures performance characteristics are as similar as possible. Using FSR significantly reduces restore time and allows load testing to begin immediately.

Provisioned IOPS volumes would introduce different performance characteristics and unnecessary cost. Standard snapshot restore would delay testing due to gradual block hydration.

Therefore, using FSR with the same EBS volume type is the fastest and most accurate solution.

AWS Systems Manager Run Command includes a built-in rate control feature that allows administrators to control the maximum number of concurrent executions across target instances. This directly addresses the requirement to limit downloads to 30 at a time without custom orchestration or additional services.

By targeting instances using tags, the solution automatically scales as new instances are added, which aligns with future growth expectations. Rate control ensures controlled concurrency and protects the private repository from overload.

Option A is manual and does not scale operationally. Option B introduces unnecessary complexity with Lambda and concurrency management that does not map cleanly to instance execution concurrency. Option D significantly increases architectural complexity without added value.

Run Command with rate control is the simplest, most native, and most scalable solution.

The AWS Cloud Operations and Systems Manager documentation states that to use Session Manager privately within a VPC (without internet access), three interface VPC endpoints must be configured:

com.amazonaws.<region>.ssm – enables Systems Manager core API communication.

com.amazonaws.<region>.ec2messages – allows the agent to send and receive messages between EC2 and Systems Manager.

com.amazonaws.<region>.ssmmessages – enables real-time interactive communication for Session Manager connections.

These endpoints ensure secure, private connectivity over the AWS network, eliminating the need for public internet routing.

Endpoints for S3, Step Functions, or EC2 API (Options C, E, F) are not required for Session Manager functionality.

Thus, the correct combination is A, B, and D, aligning with AWS CloudOps best practices for secure, private Systems Manager access.

Per the AWS Cloud Operations, Networking, and Security documentation, the best practice for serving private S3 content securely to end users is to use Amazon CloudFront with Origin Access Control (OAC).

OAC enables CloudFront to access S3 buckets privately, even when Block Public Access settings are enabled at the account level. This allows content to be delivered globally and securely without making the S3 bucket public. The bucket policy explicitly allows access only from the CloudFront distribution, ensuring that users can retrieve PDF files only via CloudFront URLs.

This configuration offers:

Automatic scalability through CloudFront caching,

Improved security via private access control,

Minimal administration effort with fully managed services.

Other options require manual handling or make the bucket public, violating AWS security best practices.

Therefore, Option B—using CloudFront with Origin Access Control and a restrictive bucket policy—provides the most secure, efficient, and low-maintenance CloudOps solution.

The least-effort, most scalable approach to ensure consistent software installation and ongoing updates across tagged Windows instances is to use AWS Systems Manager’s native software distribution and desired-state capabilities. Systems Manager Distributor lets you package third-party software as an “SSM package,” version it, and publish updates in a controlled way. This directly supports the requirement to install a third-party agent and deploy periodic updates when new versions are available.

State Manager Associations let you enforce configuration continuously or on a schedule across a fleet, targeting instances by tags (which the scenario explicitly says are in place). By creating an association that runs AWS-ConfigureAWSPackage, you instruct Systems Manager to install (and optionally update) a specific SSM package on all instances that match the Windows tag criteria. This provides ongoing compliance: newly launched instances that receive the tag will automatically get the agent installed, and existing instances will receive updates according to the association’s frequency and the package version strategy.

Option C (custom Lambda that logs in) is high operational overhead and poor practice (credentials, connectivity, error handling, scaling, and security concerns). Option D (RunRemoteScript) can work but is more brittle than ConfigureAWSPackage because it shifts lifecycle management (versioning, state, idempotency) into scripts. Option B (OpsItem + Inventory) is not an enforcement mechanism for installation/updating; it’s for operations tracking and visibility.

Therefore, Distributor (A) + State Manager association using AWS-ConfigureAWSPackage targeted by tags (E) is the cleanest and lowest-ops solution.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Documents:

Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) are Region-specific resources. AWS CloudOps documentation explicitly states that an AMI created in one Region cannot be used to launch instances in another Region unless it is copied to the target Region. Therefore, the SysOps administrator must copy the AMI to both us-east-1 and us-east-2.

The AMI copy process creates a new AMI in each destination Region and automatically copies the underlying snapshots. Once the AMIs exist in the target Regions, they can be referenced in launch templates, Auto Scaling groups, or AWS CloudFormation templates for consistent multi-Region deployments.

Option B is incorrect because making an AMI public does not replicate it across Regions. Option C is incorrect because sharing an AMI only grants account-level access within the same Region. Option D is incorrect because AMIs cannot be launched from Amazon S3 directly.

This approach aligns with AWS CloudOps automation practices for multi-Region application deployment and disaster recovery readiness.

High availability requires removing single-AZ risk and eliminating manual recovery. The AWS Reliability best practices state to design for multi-AZ and automatic healing: Auto Scaling “helps maintain application availability and allows you to automatically add or remove EC2 instances” (AWS Auto Scaling User Guide). The Reliability Pillar recommends to “distribute workloads across multiple Availability Zones” and to “automate recovery from failure” (AWS Well-Architected Framework – Reliability Pillar). Attaching the Auto Scaling group to an ALB target group enables health-based replacement: instances failing load balancer health checks are replaced and traffic is routed only to healthy targets. Using an AMI in a launch template ensures consistent, repeatable instance configuration (AWS EC2 Launch Templates). Options A and C keep all instances in a single Availability Zone and rely on manual or ad-hoc restarts, which do not meet high-availability or resiliency goals. Option B only scales vertically and adds a restart rule; it neither removes the single-AZ failure domain nor provides automated replacement. Therefore, creating a multi-AZ EC2 Auto Scaling group with a launch template and attaching it to the ALB target group (Option D) is the CloudOps-aligned solution for resilience and business continuity.

AWS Systems Manager Inventory is designed to collect metadata from managed instances, including installed software, applications, and patch information. It works asynchronously and does not require instances to be actively running a command at the time of collection, which is critical when instances may be busy or temporarily unavailable during patch windows.

Inventory data is stored centrally and can be queried to generate reports showing the current patch level or installed patch versions across all managed instances. This makes it well-suited for large fleets that include both On-Demand and Spot Instances and that may scale dynamically.

Option B relies on Run Command, which requires instances to be online and available at execution time. This does not meet the requirement because some instances were already missed during patch operations due to being busy or down. Option C and Option D use AWS Config, which is primarily intended for configuration compliance and drift detection, not detailed patch version reporting. Creating custom or managed rules for patch status introduces unnecessary complexity and overhead compared to Inventory’s built-in capability.

Therefore, Systems Manager Inventory provides the most operationally efficient and reliable solution for collecting and reporting patch version data across all EC2 instances.

In cross-account S3 replication, a common cause of “Access Denied” when reading replicated objects is object ownership. By default, the replicated objects can remain owned by the source account (the account that originally wrote the objects). Even though the objects are physically stored in the destination bucket, the destination account’s users can be blocked from accessing them unless the correct ACLs or ownership controls are in place. This becomes especially visible in disaster recovery or nonproduction copy scenarios where the destination account expects to independently read and manage replicated data.

Amazon S3 provides an option in replication configuration to change the replica object ownership to the destination bucket owner. When enabled, the destination account becomes the owner of the replicated objects, which aligns access control with the bucket ownership and the destination account’s IAM policies. This removes the common cross-account ownership mismatch and resolves Access Denied errors for legitimate users in the destination account who have permissions on the destination bucket.

Option B relates to which objects are included in replication (prefix scoping). If replication were scoped incorrectly, the symptom would typically be missing objects rather than Access Denied on objects that are present. Option C (S3 RTC) is about replication time guarantees and monitoring; elapsed time does not change ownership or permissions and therefore does not resolve Access Denied. Option D (storage class changes) affects cost and retrieval characteristics, not authorization; it would not typically produce Access Denied for standard reads solely because the storage class differs.

Therefore, updating the replication configuration to ensure replicated objects are owned by the destination bucket owner is the correct fix to restore access.

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Per the AWS Cloud Operations and S3 Data Management documentation, Cross-Region Replication (CRR) automatically replicates new objects between S3 buckets across Regions. However, CRR alone does not retroactively replicate existing objects created before replication configuration. To include such objects, AWS introduced S3 Batch Replication.

S3 Batch Replication scans the source bucket and replicates all existing objects that were not copied previously. Additionally, it can retry failed replication tasks automatically, ensuring regulatory compliance for complete dataset replication.

S3 Replication Time Control (S3 RTC) guarantees predictable replication times for new objects only—it does not cover previously stored data. S3 Lifecycle rules (Option D) move or transition objects between storage classes or buckets, but not in a replication context.

Therefore, the correct solution is to use S3 Cross-Region Replication (CRR) combined with S3 Batch Replication to ensure all current and future data is synchronized across Regions with retry capability.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Doocuments:

AWS CloudFormation supports the DeletionPolicy attribute to control what happens to a resource when a stack is deleted. For Amazon RDS DB instances, setting DeletionPolicy: Snapshot instructs CloudFormation to retain a final DB snapshot automatically at stack deletion. CloudOps best practice recommends using this native mechanism for data retention and auditability, avoiding manual scripts or out-of-band processes. Options A, B, and D introduce operational overhead and potential human error. With DeletionPolicy set to Snapshot, the environment can be repeatedly created and torn down while preserving data states for later restoration with minimal manual steps. This aligns with IaC principles—declarative, repeatable, and reliable—and supports efficient lifecycle management of ephemeral development stacks.

The PrivateDnsName attribute of an EC2 instance is automatically assigned by AWS at launch time and is a read-only property. CloudFormation does not allow users to specify this value manually.

Including PrivateDnsName in the EC2 instance properties causes validation to fail during stack creation. Outputs and Parameters sections are optional, and the VPC is implicitly defined through the subnet ID.

Therefore, attempting to set PrivateDnsName results in stack creation failure.

To detect CPU utilization issues within a 2-minute window, detailed monitoring is required. Basic monitoring publishes metrics at 5-minute intervals, which is too coarse to reliably detect a condition lasting only 2 minutes. Detailed monitoring publishes metrics at 1-minute granularity, allowing precise detection.

Amazon CloudWatch alarms support EC2 reboot actions directly, eliminating the need for custom Lambda functions. This minimizes administrative overhead and leverages native AWS integrations.

Options C and D introduce unnecessary complexity and delay. Option A cannot meet the timing requirement due to metric granularity.

Therefore, using a CloudWatch alarm with detailed monitoring and an EC2 reboot action is the correct solution.

According to the AWS Cloud Operations and Security documentation, AWS CloudTrail is the authoritative service for recording API activity across all AWS services within an account.

When an access key is compromised, CloudTrail logs all API requests made using that key, including details such as:

The user identity (access key ID) that made the request,

The service, operation, resource, and timestamp affected, and

The source IP address and region of the request.

By searching the CloudTrail event history for the specific access key ID, the CloudOps engineer can identify every action performed by that key during the suspected breach window.

Other options are incorrect:

EventBridge (A) is event-driven, not historical.

CloudWatch Logs (B) monitors system logs, not AWS API activity.

VPC Flow Logs (D) track network-level traffic, not API calls.

Therefore, the correct solution is Option C — using AWS CloudTrail event history to audit and trace all actions executed via the compromised access key.

The AWS Cloud Operations and Security documentation confirms that AWS WAF (Web Application Firewall) is designed to protect web applications from application-layer threats, including SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), and other OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities.

When integrated with an Application Load Balancer, AWS WAF inspects incoming traffic using rule groups. The AWS Managed Rules for SQL Injection Protection provide preconfigured, continuously updated filters that detect and block malicious SQL patterns.

AWS Shield (Standard or Advanced) defends against DDoS attacks, not application-layer SQL attacks, and vulnerability scanners (Option C) only detect, not prevent, exploitation.

Thus, Option D provides the correct, managed, and automated protection aligned with AWS best practices.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Documents:

The requirement is to alert before throttling occurs. For a DynamoDB table in provisioned capacity mode, throttling happens when demand approaches or exceeds provisioned throughput. CloudWatch provides direct table metrics such as ConsumedReadCapacityUnits and ProvisionedReadCapacityUnits (and related utilization signals). Creating an alarm on ConsumedReadCapacityUnits with a threshold set close to the table’s provisioned read capacity provides an early warning that the table is nearing its limit—before actual throttling prevents reads. The alarm can publish directly to the existing SNS topic so the operations team is notified proactively.

Option C and D focus on detecting throttling after it occurs by matching throttling exceptions in logs. That is reactive and violates “before throttled.” Option B (auto scaling) may reduce the likelihood of throttling, but it does not directly satisfy the alerting requirement and “scaling events” notifications are not a reliable proxy for “approaching throttle” (and may not fire early enough depending on scaling configuration). The simplest, most direct CloudOps approach is a CloudWatch alarm on consumption nearing provisioned capacity.

The number of AWS Trusted Advisor checks available to an account depends on the AWS Support plan associated with the account. The Basic and Developer support plans provide access to a limited set of Trusted Advisor checks, primarily focused on security and service limits.

The Business and Enterprise support plans provide full access to all Trusted Advisor checks, including cost optimization, performance, fault tolerance, and security categories.

Running EC2 instances, SCPs, or MFA settings do not affect the availability of Trusted Advisor checks.

Therefore, the AWS Support plan determines the quantity of available Trusted Advisor checks.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Documents:

The most operationally efficient solution is C because AWS Systems Manager Session Manager is purpose-built for secure, auditable interactive access to EC2 instances at scale—without managing bastion hosts or distributing SSH keys. Session Manager can be configured to log session activity, including commands and output, to durable destinations such as Amazon CloudWatch Logs (and optionally Amazon S3). This directly satisfies the requirement to record interactive sessions and store logs durably.

For automated notifications and alarms, CloudWatch Logs supports metric filters that transform matching log patterns into CloudWatch metrics. Those metrics can then drive CloudWatch alarms and notifications (for example, via Amazon SNS). This is a standard CloudOps pattern: centralize logs, derive metrics from security-relevant patterns, and alert automatically.

Option A and D require installing and operating agents and building a more complex analytics path (Athena queries for alerting), which is less efficient and introduces more moving parts across thousands of instances. Option B adds a bastion host dependency that becomes an operational burden (scaling, patching, hardening, HA) and a potential choke point. Session Manager reduces these burdens by using SSM Agent already installed, IAM-based access control, and centralized logging/monitoring integrations.

According to the AWS Cloud Operations and Identity Management documentation, when configuring federation between IAM Identity Center (formerly AWS SSO) and an external SAML 2.0 identity provider, two key prerequisites are required:

The IAM Identity Center SAML metadata file — This is uploaded to the external IdP to establish trust, define SAML endpoints, and enable identity federation.

The IdP metadata (including the public X.509 certificate) — This information is imported into IAM Identity Center to validate authentication assertions and encryption signatures.

IAM Identity Center and the IdP exchange this metadata to mutually establish secure, bidirectional federation.

Network-level details such as IP addresses (Option C) are unnecessary. Root access (Option D) or permissions to member accounts (Option E) are not required; only Control Tower or IAM administrative permissions in the management account are needed for setup.

Thus, the correct answer is A and B — the SAML metadata from both sides is required for federation.

CloudWatch Logs metric filters allow log data to be converted into CloudWatch metrics in near real time. This enables continuous monitoring without custom code or scheduled queries. Metric filters are ideal when log events have a consistent structure and specific patterns, such as HTTP response codes.

By defining a metric filter that matches HTTP 404 responses, CloudWatch can increment a metric each time a 404 occurs. This metric can then be used for dashboards, alarms, and trend analysis. This approach is fully managed, scalable, and requires minimal operational effort.

Options B, C, and D rely on subscription filters or periodic queries, which introduce unnecessary complexity, latency, and maintenance overhead. Therefore, metric filters are the most efficient solution.

AWS CloudOps automation best practices recommend using AWS Systems Manager Quick Setup for organization-wide management and configuration of EC2 instances. The Default Host Management Configuration Quick Setup automatically enables Systems Manager capabilities such as Patch Manager, Inventory, Session Manager, and Automation across all managed instances within the organization.

When deployed from the management account, Quick Setup automatically integrates with AWS Organizations to propagate configuration and permissions to existing and future accounts. This meets the requirement for organization-wide management with no manual configuration or SSH access. AWS documentation notes:

“You can use Quick Setup in the management account of an organization in AWS Organizations to configure Systems Manager capabilities for all accounts and Regions. Quick Setup automatically keeps configurations up to date.”

Options B, C, and D require custom deployments or manual IAM updates, lacking centralized automation. Therefore, Option A fully satisfies CloudOps standards for automated provisioning and ongoing management of EC2 instances across an organization.

AWS Security Hub is the native AWS service that provides continuous compliance checks against security standards, including the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark. When integrated with AWS Organizations, Security Hub can automatically enroll existing and newly created accounts, eliminating manual invitations and scripts.

By designating a Security Hub administrator account and enabling automatic account onboarding, the organization ensures consistent security posture monitoring across all accounts. CIS benchmark checks are run continuously, and findings are aggregated centrally, simplifying governance and remediation workflows.

Amazon Inspector focuses on vulnerability scanning for EC2, container images, and Lambda functions—not CIS compliance. GuardDuty is a threat detection service and does not run CIS benchmarks.

Therefore, using AWS Security Hub with automatic organization-wide enrollment is the most efficient solution.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of AWS CloudOps Documents:

The requirement is that traffic from a VPC-connected Lambda to Amazon S3 must not use public IP addresses. The AWS-native way to keep traffic private is to use VPC endpoints, which provide private connectivity to supported AWS services without traversing the public internet. Among the options, creating an S3 VPC endpoint is the only approach that satisfies “no public IP addresses” while allowing access to the bucket. Option D is the best match because it explicitly configures an S3 endpoint and directs the Lambda function to use the endpoint-specific DNS name for private routing.

Option C (NAT gateway) is incorrect for this requirement because NAT provides outbound internet access from private subnets and typically uses public IP addressing at the NAT gateway. That violates the intent to avoid public IP paths for S3 traffic. Option A is not applicable because S3 buckets are not placed “inside” a VPC and do not participate in VPC sharing in a way that provides private network paths. Option B (transit gateway) connects VPCs and on-prem networks, but it does not create private service connectivity to S3 by itself; you would still need the correct service endpoint solution for S3 access.

Using a VPC endpoint also aligns with CloudOps best practices: it reduces exposure, simplifies network egress controls, and supports least-privilege access via endpoint policies (where applicable) alongside IAM policies.